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Abstract
Pollack, Sarah: German and the European Migrant Crisis: An Exploration of
German National Identity
Advisor: Çiğdem Çıdam
Since 2014, conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East have brought large
inflows of asylum-seekers streaming into Europe. Germany has not only accepted the
greatest number of these asylum-seekers, but it has additionally pushed for other
European Union member states to accept more asylum-seekers as well, thereby earning
an international reputation as a leading proponent of human rights in the European Union.
While images of German citizens crowding train stations in Munich and other cities to
welcome refugees have dominated news cycles, there is an increasing anti-immigration
sentiment in Germany, which at its most extreme has manifested itself in the forms of
anti-immigration violence and the Islamaphobic Pegida movement. My thesis suggests
that to fully understand this conflict, it is necessary to approach it as not only an issue of
immigration politics, but as a political conflict over what it means to be German. In
exploring this topic, I will provide a history of post-World War II immigration to
Germany and an overview of the immigration debate in the country. I will additionally
discuss the EU’s involvement in the development of refugee law and the effects of
Schengen on the current migrant crisis, as well as Germany’s role in the EU. By
providing a detailed account of the evolution of German national identity after World
War II, I will frame Germany’s role in the crisis in the context of the political conflict
over German national identity.
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Introduction

“We just wanted them to know that the torture is over,” said Hedy Gupta, when
interviewed by a reporter from The Guardian in September 2015. She was handing out chocolate
to incoming refugees at Munich’s main train station—and she was in good company (GrahamHarrison et al. 2015). As their trains arrived in Munich, refugees were greeted by signs bearing
welcoming messages and volunteers who provided food, water, and other essentials. One night
train manager commented on the refugees’ warm welcome at the station: “Time was the police
used to throw Syrian families off the train. Now they’re handing out chocolate bars to them. I
think that change in attitude goes for most Germans as a whole” (Connolly 2015). Images of
Germans’ support for incoming refugees were broadcast across international media, garnering
the country a reputation as a beacon of humanitarianism amidst the migrant crisis.
When compared to the violently racist attitudes that culminated in the human rights
abuses of the Holocaust, Germany’s transition to a nation so willing to take in foreigners in need
is truly astounding. Of course, despite this popularly promoted human rights narrative, the reality
of Germany’s transition is much more complex, complicated by persisting anti-immigration
rhetoric, which is voiced by the Islamaphobic Pegida and other far right groups, an inconsistent
history of asylum policy in Germany, and the country’s layered—and oftentimes contradictory—
attitudes towards immigration policy.
What is particularly fascinating about post-World War II German society are its attempts
to reconfigure German national identity. Ideas of a German national identity defined by shared
ethnicity helped give rise to National Socialism, and after its fall in 1945, Germans were left
reeling from the regime’s violent and inhumane actions. Through the remainder of the 20th
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century, Germans sought to reconstruct German national identity in different terms, one that
would not return them to the horrors of their past. The debate that is currently taking place over
Germany’s role in the migrant crisis is representative of a larger debate in Germany over just
what it means to be German. While Germany has been lauded for its devotion to supporting
human rights during this crisis—and in comparison to its neighbors, this reputation is certainly
deserved—it is hard to say if a genuine desire to protect human rights has been Germany’s
primary motivation in the crisis. Rather, this support of human rights appears to be one facet of a
broader movement in Germany, one which rejects any ideals that mirror those of National
Socialism, embracing instead a national identity that is defined solely on a legal basis. On the
other side of the debate are those who support the older, ethnically homogeneous definition of
German national identity. This debate over German national identity has manifested itself most
acutely in the heated debates over the migrant crisis in Germany today.
In order to understand Germany’s response to the migrant crisis, I will detail the EU’s
immigration policies, Germany’s role in the EU, and the debates over both immigration and the
current migrant crisis in Germany. Refugee law began in Europe after 1945 and it is imperative
to have knowledge of the development of Schengen and the EU’s immigration policies in order
to understand the politics and debate surrounding the migrant crisis, as well as the failure of the
EU to support refugee rights. While Germany has taken a leading role in the EU during the
migrant crisis, its response cannot be fully understood without analyzing the discourse in
Germany concerning this crisis, as well as the debates surrounding immigration and integration,
which have perpetuated since the arrival of the guestworkers—foreign laborers—shortly after
World War II. These debates paint the picture of a Germany that is fractured in terms of national
identity, with some Germans pushing for immigration and inclusion, and others taking a
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staunchly anti-immigration stance that views ethnicity as an irrefutable facet of German national
identity. Because one side of the debate has so fiercely promoted human rights—and this is
currently the rhetoric of Merkel’s government in response to the migrant crisis—it is necessary
to analyze Germany’s role in the EU, especially as the EU has consistently failed to uphold
refugee law and support human rights during the crisis.
In the first chapter of this thesis, I will provide an overview of international refugee law,
which was conceived in response to the horrors of World War II, and identify key terms, such as
“refugee,” “asylum-seeker,” and “migrant.” These terms frequently overlap in political rhetoric
and the media and it is impossible to fully comprehend the crisis without first understanding the
distinctions between them. The chapter will then delve into the details of the Schengen
Agreement, a cornerstone of European unity and identity, as its implementation has had
controversial consequences for asylum-seekers and refugees’ rights and it has substantially
complicated the current crisis. I will provide criticisms of Schengen, as well as the European
Union’s frequently utilized methods of avoiding their responsibilities as outlined in refugee law,
such as its border control practices and poor maintenance of refugee camps. I will provide
context for the current migrant crisis, as well as Germany’s own asylum-policies and its role in
crafting a broad European identity. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an understanding of
the history of refugee law and the responsibilities it bestows upon EU member states. While
Germany has been hailed as the leading proponent of human rights in the EU under the
conditions of the migrant crisis, this image is compromised by the EU’s shaky history in
supporting the rights of refugees and asylum-seekers.
The second chapter will focus on the evolution of German national identity, beginning
with the country’s increased multiculturalism as brought on by its guestworker program, and the
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anti-immigration sentiment that followed it. I will additionally provide an overview of the
evolution of German national identity as it is recalibrated by three generations of Germans with
very different conceptions of national identity: the “forty-fivers,” who came of age in 1945; the
non-German Germans, who emerged in the 1950s under the political theorist Jürgen Habermas;
and finally the “sixty-eighters,” who earned their title in the youth protests of 1968. I will
juxtapose the non-German Germans’ conception of German national identity with the changes to
German nationality law at the beginning of the 21st century, which reflected the increasingly
multicultural character of German society. The chapter additionally explores German attitudes
towards immigration, as well as the debate in Germany concerning the integration of immigrants.
In this chapter, I seek to connect the history of Germany’s immigration policies and attitudes
toward immigrants to the broader debate over German national identity.
The third chapter details the evolution of German asylum law, which has become
increasingly restrictive since its implementation in 1949, and examines the reasons for this
change. While the right of asylum is outlined in Article 16 of the German Constitution, it has
undergone several amendments since 1949 that have limited benefits to asylum-seekers and
curbed their opportunities to appeal negative decisions. The increasingly restrictive nature of
German asylum policies appears to be in direct contrast to its humanitarian role in the current
crisis, as it represents the anti-immigration sentiment that is shared by many Germans. I then
provide an overview of the current migrant crisis affecting Europe and the EU’s largely
fragmented response to it, with Eastern European countries generally reluctant to accept asylumseekers and Western European countries and the EU pressuring the East to share the burden.
Germany’s role in the crisis is highlighted and explored, from its leadership in the EU to
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conditions for asylum-seekers and refugees within Germany itself. The chapter will furthermore
provide insight into the intense and sometimes vitriolic debate in Germany concerning the crisis.
The conclusion brings these chapters together, examining German policies and general
attitudes in the context of the evolution of German national identity in the aftermath of the
trauma of World War II. This thesis seeks to prove that the debate within Germany is not solely
about the country’s role in the migrant crisis, but is additionally representative of a larger debate
over German national identity. Despite the popular narrative in international media, neither
Germany’s role in the crisis nor its national identity can be attributed solely to an unwavering
devotion to humanitarian values and a tolerance for diversity. While these values are supported
by many Germans, they are part of a larger movement that seeks to redefine German national
identity as strictly political. Meanwhile, there remains a significant segment of the German
population that rejects a purely political definition of German national identity, supporting
instead a national identity defined by a shared ethnicity and culture. At its basis, the
fragmentation among German society over the migrant crisis is spurred by a greater question:
What does it mean to be German?

6
Chapter One: International Refugee Law and Schengen

Introduction
Before one can begin to understand German immigration and asylum policies, one must
first be able to frame them in the context of the EU’s policies. Since the inception of Schengen in
1985, the EU has struggled to balance the lightening of security along interior borders with
increasingly heightened security along its external boundaries. Its practices have been accused of
being ineffective and even dangerous towards migrants, despite such advanced and widereaching security systems as Eurodac and the Schengen Information System, as well as its
security agency, Frontex, and the 1990 Dublin Regulation. Furthermore, its immigration policies
are often exclusionary and only contribute to the influx of migrants through illegal means. For
the continent that drove the creation and development of refugee law, European governments are
now notably resistant to accept refugees. This chapter will examine these topics, first by defining
the term “refugee,” especially as it differs from “economic migrant” and “asylum-seeker,” as
these terms are frequently and intentionally blurred in public and political discourse. It will
additionally provide an overview of the history of international refugee law and detail the efforts
of the EU and individual governments to address the situation of asylum-seekers and other
migrants, such as through border control and refugee camps, as well as identify common
criticisms of these policies and practices.

International Refugee Law
The concept of the refugee is a relatively new one. In fact, it only emerged in the years
succeeding World War II, as European governments struggled to find a solution for the masses
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of displaced persons within their borders (Malkki 497). In a move perhaps prophetic of the
quality of future refugee camps, many refugees were placed in former work and concentration
camps in Germany in the years immediately following the war. Liisa Malkki, in “Refugees and
Exile,” suggests that the postwar shame in Europe, stemming from states’ denial of asylum to so
many people fleeing the Holocaust, was a primary driver in the development and nature of
international refugee law (Malkki 500).
As the concept of the refugee developed in the years following World War II, so too did
international refugee law. Article 44 of the Geneva Conventions, added on August 12, 1949,
declared that a refugee cannot be considered an enemy alien based on nationality alone (GrahlMadsen 283). The 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, which put its focus
primarily on the refugee situation in Europe, added to the Geneva Conventions the definition of
“refugee” that remains unchanged to this day (Malkki 501, Loy et al. 14). The Convention
defines a refugee as a person who is outside of his or her country of origin and who has a “wellfounded fear of persecution” based on race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular
group, or political opinion, if that person were to return to his or her country. Accordingly, in
order to earn the label of “refugee,” one must prove that he or she would be the target of existing
human rights abuses in his or her own country (Loy 14).
Those who are determined by states to be refugees are privy to several rights laid out in
the Geneva Conventions. Article 31, ratified on July 28, 1951 alongside the following Articles,
states that refugees shall not be penalized for illegal entry into the country where they seek
refuge. Article 32 prohibits the expulsion of a refugee unless he or she represents a threat to
national security or public order (Grahl-Madsen 283). Article 33 forbids the forcible deportation
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of refugees to countries where they will likely face persecution. This is known as the
nonrefoulement obligation. (Grahl-Madsen 283, Loy et al. 18).
Furthermore, the 1953 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) lays out certain
rights for refugees. Article 3 of the Convention forbids the expulsion of a refugee if it can be
proven that he or she will be subjected to ill-treatment if returned to his or her home country
(Lambert 41, Gibney 15). Meanwhile, Article 8 forbids expulsion if it would threaten an aspect
of the refugee’s private life, which includes sexual orientation and mental health, among others,
and Article 6 prohibits the expulsion of a refugee to his or her home country if it can be proven
that he or she will be denied justice there (Lambert 43-45). In effect, the Convention elaborates
and expands on the circumstances that might violate the nonrefoulement obligation.
“Refugee” is not synonymous with “asylum-seeker,” although the two are often
considered interchangeable. An asylum-seeker is a person who has yet to or is in the process of
applying for asylum, which would entitle him or her to residence and protection within the
asylum-granting country. When the person’s claim has been evaluated and he or she has been
granted asylum, then he or she will formally become a refugee. (UNHCR 2015, “Refugees”).
Stated most simply, refugees have been granted residence and protection in a particular country,
while asylum-seekers have not yet secured those rights. Another important distinction to make is
that between “refugee” and “economic migrant,” as the two terms are often deliberately confused
in political discourse. While populist politics and anti-immigration sentiment often—and
frequently intentionally—blur this distinction, the Office for the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) places them into separate categories (Zahra 7, UNHCR
2015, “Refugees”). While economic migrants move in order to better their financial prospects,
refugees move because their lives or freedom are threatened (UNHCR 2015, “Refugees”).
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It is particularly important to emphasize how limited, yet malleable, the definition of
refugee is. Those who are fleeing wars or invasions do not, strictly by the wording of the
definition, actually fall under the category of refugee (Loy et al. 16). Nonetheless, it can still be
argued that a person fleeing civil war is additionally fleeing persecution for belonging to a
particular group (Sierakowski 2015). The Geneva Conventions’ definition of “refugee” is almost
contradictorily both limited and malleable. As such, there has been significant discussion amid
the current crisis in Europe over how to determine who exactly qualifies for asylum and who
does not.
By the wording of the Geneva Conventions alone, the definition of “refugee” is clear. In
practice, however, determining who qualifies as a refugee is considerably more difficult. Often
through anti-immigration intention and sometimes through earnest confusion, refugees and
asylum-seekers are mistaken for economic migrants. Furthermore, it can be challenging to
determine which asylum-seekers’ situations are congruent with the types of persecution
described out in the Geneva Conventions. As such, especially given the overwhelming number
of people currently arriving in Europe, European governments are struggling to determine who
among them are privy to the rights of the Geneva Conventions. This is important to bear in mind
as this paper examines the methods through which the EU addresses—or fails to address—the
waves of migrants and refugees seeking a new home within its borders.

Schengen: An Overview
The Schengen plan was first brought to discussion at a June 14, 1985 meeting in
Luxembourg. The attendees were France, Germany, and the Benelux countries. The Schengen
concept was innocuous enough; border control between these countries would lighten, allowing
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citizens freer travel between them. It would be a symbol of postwar Europe, united in shared
history and culture. In the thirty years following the meeting, at least 15,551 migrants have died
while trying to cross Schengen’s borders, as estimated by organization United (Carr 3). How
could a proposal for more open borders have produced such a devastating outcome? The answer
lies primarily in EU policies and border control, but these must first be framed in the context of
Schengen’s history.
The Schengen Convention was signed in 1990 in Luxembourg, where it had first been
brought to the table five years before. It encouraged more open borders between the participating
countries, thus providing citizens with freer mobility. Negotiations over Schengen were not easy;
as problems arose, such as the question of how to reduce crime while maintaining open borders,
countries proposed the solutions that were most congruent with their own legal system and
culture (Kapteyn 367). The Schengen Information System, which will be detailed later, can be
considered as one answer to this question (University of Exeter). Germany was most persistent
about the continuation of these negotiations, while France held the most weight in decisionmaking (Kapteyn 367). In fact, Germany’s role in decision-making was remarkably limited, as at
the time, its postwar legacy effectively dictated that it show restraint in expressing its sovereign
interests. Instead, it sought a greater European identity in place of its fractured national one. Thus,
the success of Schengen was a priority for Germany, even if it came at the expense of its other
sovereign interests (Kapteyn 366). Germany and France were especially in favor of Schengen’s
creation, as the Benelux and Nordic countries had already formed their own similar unifications
and Germany and France were interested in obtaining the same trade, immigration, and policing
opportunities for themselves, such as the cooperation that would later result in the Schengen
Information System (University of Exeter).
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Of further significance is the Dublin Regulation, which began in 1990 as a sort of
response to Schengen. The Regulation, which is unique to the EU, Norway, Iceland,
Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg, mandates that refugees must be granted refuge in the first
country they enter (Sierakowski 2015). In addition to the aforementioned regulation, Dublin
establishes a criterion for determining which state is responsible for examining an applicant’s
claim to asylum. This is based on ties to any family members already within Europe and state of
first entry and it is meant to ensure that certain high standards, such as the maintenance of the
rights to information and a personal interview, are applied to all examinations of asylum claims
(ECRE, “Dublin Regulation”).
By the time the Schengen Accords came into being on March 16, 1995, Portugal and
Spain had joined the Schengen area as well (Carr 26). Matthew Carr attributes the ten-year delay
in actually implementing Schengen to the fortress-like components that define the area now; as
time passed, governments grew concerned about the vulnerability of open borders. As will be
detailed later, this concern has manifested itself in the development of heightened security at the
EU’s external borders (Carr 27). Perhaps this outcome should have been predicted, as countries
began displaying a certain level of discomfort with the open borders from the outset. For
example, on June 29, 1995, the same year as Schengen’s implementation, France announced that
it would maintain border controls with all its neighbors as it attempted to quell illegal
immigration and drug smuggling. Then, on July 8, France and Spain reinforced the border
between them due to Basque terrorist activity in the area (Convey and Kupszewski 940).
Nonetheless, these temporary speed bumps could not deter Schengen. Schengen was
finally incorporated into the legal framework of the EU by the 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam (Carr
26). This created what is formally known as the Area of Freedom, Security, and Justice, which
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will be referred to in this paper by its more common name, which, by no great surprise, is the
Schengen area (Angelescu 73). Today, Schengen consists of all of the EU except for Bulgaria,
Ireland, Romania, Croatia, Cyprus, and the UK, as well as the non-EU countries of Iceland,
Norway, Liechtenstein, and Switzerland.

Migrants in the European Union
For all their effort in establishing an international refugee law in the 1950s, European
countries have become particularly resistant to most kinds of immigration. From the challenge of
entering European states to the threat of deportation once inside them, immigrants do not find as
welcoming an environment in Europe as the Geneva Conventions might suggest. Schengen’s
borders do not end at its geographic edges; rather, they permeate throughout Europe in an effort
to repel newcomers.
To begin, one must identify the different types of migrants that come to Europe, as they
both influence and are influenced by migration laws. Andrew Convey and Marek Kupiszewski
identify three categories of international migrants. The first of these are short-term visitors, who
are typically admitted on a tourist or scientific visa and do not stay for more than a few months.
The second category is that of mid-term migrants, who are usually traveling to Europe to work or
study for more than a few months. They require permits along with their visas and often try for
citizenship. The final category is that of lifelong migrants. It is more or less impossible for
migrants to achieve this unless they can claim citizenship or are seeking asylum (Convey and
Kupszewski 943). Since not all migrants can claim citizenship, and therefore cannot stay longterm, it is little wonder that anti-immigration voices might suggest that refugees are economic
migrants in disguise, seeking an easy way in to Europe’s borders.
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It is additionally pertinent to specify that the task of granting visas is divided between the
EU and individual countries. While the EU is responsible for granting short-term visas, longterm visas are an issue for its member states (Angelescu 75). Considering this, it is
understandable why, as will be addressed later on, the quality of the handling of asylum cases in
different countries is so inconsistent.
The EU’s acceptance—or rather, lack thereof—of migrants has been criticized as being
more favorable towards people from certain regions of the world. Xavier Ferrer-Gallardo and
Henk van Houtum describe a “negative list” of 135 poor countries, whose emigrants find more
difficulty accessing the EU than do those from the “positive list” of 60 developed countries
(Ferrer-Gallardo and van Houtum 299). Convey and Kupszewski address three specific
categories of aliens that are recognized within the EU: citizens of other EU countries, citizens of
non-EU European Free Trade Association countries, and citizens of all other countries.
Immigrants in these categories have different experiences when attempting to settle in a new EU
state, including differing entry visa requirements, obtainment of work and residence permits, and
paths to naturalization (Convey and Kupszewski 944). The EU’s strict immigration policies have
a strong relationship to the appeal of asylum-seeking as a means of entering Europe.
Furthermore, the practice of detention of migrants in Europe strongly affects asylumseekers, often through carelessness on the parts of border security forces. Article 31 of the
Geneva Conventions states, as mentioned previously, that asylum-seekers must not be penalized
for entering another country for the purpose of claiming asylum. However, some countries
immediately detain all migrants upon arrival, meaning that asylum-seekers can end up in
immigration detention. Immigration detention is problematic in quite a number of ways, one of
which is that it lacks clear legal parameters and a time limit (Carr 132). Therefore, asylum-
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seekers can accidentally be detained for an indefinite amount of time simply for crossing a
border. While this is not directly in opposition to Article 31 of the Geneva Conventions, as
immigration detention is not technically a form of penalization, the distinction is murky at best.
Like immigration detention, deportation is a frequent practice in the EU that can
negatively impact asylum-seekers. According to a 2009 European Commission report,
approximately 200,000 migrants already inside of Europe’s borders are deported every year
(Carr 127). Some deportations are the result of voluntary return programs, which grant cash
incentives to migrants in return for their departure. These programs are the gentler alternative to
forced deportations, which are complicated and sometimes dangerous for the deportees (Carr
130). However, brutality is not the only problem with deportations. Matthew Carr provides one
example:
“Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights explicitly prohibits the
‘collective expulsion of aliens.’ In September and October 2002, however, Malta
deported 220 Eritreans after rejecting their claims for asylum en masse, despite evidence
that Eritrea was a dictatorship and police state where political dissidents and military
deserters were routinely tortured and imprisoned” (Carr 127.)
This is not a unique case. Carr additionally describes a similar one concerning Iraqi asylumseekers, who were deported in 2007 to Iraqi Kurdistan and Baghdad, although violence was still
prevalent throughout the country (Carr 129). Because these cases involved asylum-seekers rather
than refugees, it is not technically oppositional to Article 33 of the Geneva Conventions, which
prohibits the deportation of a refugee to a country where he or she will likely face persecution.
However, the distinction between asylum-seekers and refugees proves itself blurry in these cases,
and they raise serious ethical questions about how Europe’s deportation policies might put
people at risk for physical harm.
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Furthermore, the Dublin Regulation itself has been criticized for its lack of efficiency. It
is not uncommon for examinations of asylum claims to be delayed or even overlooked entirely.
Several other abuses have arisen in the system as well. For example, Belgium has sent asylumseekers to Greece under the Dublin Convention, a move that in January 2011, the Grand
Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights ruled as being in violation of Article 3 of the
European Convention on Human Rights, which forbids the expulsion of a refugee to a country
where he or she will certainly be subjected to ill-treatment. In doing so, Belgium had “[exposed]
the applicant to the detention and living conditions there” (ECRE, “Dublin Regulation”). The
ruling itself describes the conditions of the Greek detention center as “appalling,” and states that
the asylum-seekers faced a risk of ill-treatment (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 5). The Court
criticized the Dublin System as responsible for allowing such actions to occur (ECRE, “Dublin
Regulation”).
There are yet further criticisms of the EU’s immigration policies. Seyla Benhabib states
that the line between economic migrant and refugee, particularly in the context of the current
crisis, is inherently blurry, as many migrants are undoubtedly traveling in order to improve their
living conditions. Therefore, European governments themselves—whether intentionally or
otherwise—easily confuse these terms (Sierakowski 2015). Tara Zahra echoes this, stating that
Western countries proudly tout the right to asylum until greater numbers of asylum-seekers start
arriving. Then, Zahra writes, the distinction between refugees and economic migrants begins to
blur among governments and their people (Zahra 5). Carr argues that tight restrictions that make
it difficult for asylum-seekers to access Europe force these people to use the same routes of
immigration as economic migrants, increasing this confusion even further (Carr 160).
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Ferrer-Gallardo and van Houtum make what is perhaps the best case for the faultiness of
the EU’s immigration policies. They state:
“Migrants will still come, no matter how high the fence is. But because of the increasing
difficulty to get in legally, they are provoked to seek their entrances irregularly. Leading
only to more phobia and criminalization, which then is answered by yet higher fences and
a further tightening of the legal ways to enter the EU, after which the vicious cycle starts
again. The only two parties that gain from this circle are security businesses to whom the
control is increasingly contracted out and political extreme-nationalists” (Ferrer-Gallardo
and van Houtum 300.)
In short, the EU’s restrictive immigration policies only worsen the problems they seek to prevent,
namely the increasingly illegal methods of entrance by migrants. None of their policies, put into
practice, directly violate the rights set forth in the Geneva Conventions. However, this is only
because governments have found loopholes that enable them to skirt their responsibility to
uphold these rights. In part, the malleability of the definition of “refugee” can be called to blame
for this. Still, governments are entirely aware of what they are doing when they take steps to
avoid their obligations. In an unfortunate case of irony, the continent that was most critical in the
establishment and development of refugee law has continuously chosen to fail the very people it
sought to protect.

Border Control
Perhaps the most obvious manifestation of the EU’s resistance to immigration is that of
its border control. In the absence of tight security along its internal borders, responsibility for the
EU’s external borders has since fallen disproportionately onto its border states. This has,
arguably unfairly, saddled those countries with the task of enforcing the immigration restrictions
of all member states in addition to securing their borders (Carr 28). However, the European
Union has developed a broad security system in order to aid them.
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The widest reaching of these security systems is Frontex. Formally known as the
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the
Member States of the European Union, Frontex was established in 2005 to protect the EU from
threats along its external borders (Mungianu 361, Feldman 15, Reid-Henry 199). The
organization is based in Warsaw and, as of 2013, had 230 full-time staff employed in analysis
and operational organization (Feldman 15, Reid-Henry 200). It is well funded, with an annual
budget in 2011 of 88 million Euros (Feldman 16).
While Frontex is an EU agency, it is heavily involved with member states. Both EU
institutions and member states were responsible for the development of its mandate (Mungianu
361). Furthermore, although Frontex was designed to function autonomously, it cannot run
operations without support from member states (Feldman 15, Mungianu 374). However, Frontex
holds influence over member states. Frontex establishes member states’ obligations in terms of
managing their external borders (Munginau 369). In this sense, Frontex holds an enormous
amount of authority in dictating security efforts along the EU’s external boundaries.
There are several facets through which Frontex maintains border security. One is through
the collection of intelligence. Frontex will commonly detain and interview migrants to gain
information about how smugglers move (Feldman 16). Through this, the agency is able to
identify new migration routes and methods and put a stop to them, even before migrants reach
the EU’s borders. This only bolsters the EU’s already extensive security intelligence, which is
supported by the high-tech Eurodac and Schengen Information System (hereafter, SIS),
expansive databases detailing everything from suspected terrorists to the fingerprints of all
asylum claimants (Carr 28). The SIS, for example, contains alerts on such things as people
wanted for arrest, missing persons, and objects that are being sought as evidence in criminal
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trials (Europa 2015, “Alerts and data in the SIS”). Meanwhile, Eurodac, which was implemented
in 2003, is responsible for comparing all asylum-seekers’ fingerprints to those relevant to
criminal investigations (Europa 2015, “Identification of applicants”).
Another function of Frontex comes in the form of European Border Guard Teams
(EGBTs). These were established in 2011, taking over for the similar but more limited Rapid
Border Intervention Teams (RaBITs), which were groups of border control experts who were
tasked with addressing external border crises, namely those occurrences when large numbers of
migrants attempt to enter European territory (Mungianu 379, Feldman 14). These teams can be
deployed anytime within five to ten days, with the goal of preventing these migrants from
crossing the border and typically arranging for their transport back to their countries of origin
(Feldman 14). The EGBTs are intended to solve immediate crises. However, Frontex works on
long-term solutions as well.
As Irina Angelescu states, the EU is only the second line of border control. The first line
is in third countries (Angelescu 75). Frontex collaborates with non-EU countries of emigration,
most notably those in North and West Africa, in stemming migration attempts before migrants
can reach the EU’s borders. In doing so, Frontex denies these migrants the right to claim asylum
in Europe. Beginning in 2007, Frontex joined with West African states in an effort to prevent
migrant boats from entering European waters (Carr 49). In North Africa, Frontex uses its
intelligence on smuggling routes to circumvent those paths within these states (Feldman 16).
Some non-EU states have become especially involved in this effort. Morocco, for example,
established criminal penalties in 2003 on any Moroccan citizens attempting to enter Spain
without documentation (Carr 56). This extension of Frontex’s border control work into third
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countries seems particularly ironic given that its purpose is to protect the sovereignty of its own
nations’ borders.
Europe’s border control, both through Frontex and national agencies, has faced its fair
share of troubles—and criticism. One of these lies in its insistence on preventing migrants from
reaching European territory at all. The reasoning behind this is that the Geneva Conventions
dictate that states within its borders must allow all asylum-seekers to apply for refugee protection
as soon as they reach European territory (Ferrer-Gallardo and van Houtum 298, Carr 66). In what
evidently becomes a recurring theme in the EU’s anti-migration policies and practices, this effort
is meant to help states avoid their obligations to accept these asylum-seekers. This practice has
unsurprisingly led to numerous allegations of abuses among border patrol forces. Carr provides
one example:
“Migrants have been known to puncture their own boats in order to pressure the coast
guard to rescue them so that they can appeal for asylum, but the Greek coast guard has
been accused of puncturing migrants’ boats and disabling their engines before dragging
them back into Turkish waters and forcing their passengers to row back to shore with just
one oar” (Carr 94).
This is a particularly troubling practice and is representative of the flawed nature of Europe’s
border control. Perhaps it can even be conjectured that the pressure placed by Schengen on
border countries to secure the area’s boundary opens the door to these sorts of abuses in the first
place.
A second manner through which European governments avert their obligations to
asylum-seekers is by creating circumstances in which these people cannot even qualify as
asylum-seekers in the first place. In order to claim asylum, people must actively cross into
European territory. A European country’s vessels are, in fact, considered that country’s territory,
and so people should be able to claim asylum from accessing one of these vessels alone.
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However, border control skirts this rule by retrieving these asylum-seekers, taking them under
custody and thereby transforming them into “passive crossers of the ‘border’” (Reid-Henry 208.)
The distinction lies between the active crossing of European borders and the controlled, passive
crossing at the hands of border control. As such, they can be processed as felons rather than as
asylum-seekers. In fact, border control may not even explain their rights of asylum to them
(Reid-Henry 208). By rendering asylum-seekers as felons illegally crossing the border,
governments once again avoid their obligations by bending—but not outright breaking—refugee
law.
Another criticism of Europe’s border control comes in the form of accusations over the
mishandling of asylum declarations. In Slovakia, for example, asylum-seekers undergo an
interview process before being transferred to the asylum reception center in Hummene, where
their claims are assessed. However, the Slovak Border Guard has been accused of immediately
deporting asylum-seekers to Ukraine without fulfilling that process (Carr 39). Another example
comes from the island of Samos in Greece. There, untrained police, who have little knowledge
about the political situation of common emigration countries, have frequently rejected asylum
appeals purely because they are unprepared for their work (Carr 96). The first situation is an
example of border control forces’ intentional resistance to accepting asylum-seekers. The second
is due more to general incompetence and unpreparedness. However, both cases exemplify the
dangerous levels of disorganization and inefficiency that plague Europe’s security forces, EU
and otherwise.

Refugee Camps
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A particularly controversial facet of Europe’s border control is that of refugee camps.
Shortly after the refugee crisis that arose during World War II and persisted in the years
succeeding it, European countries decided that a better option for addressing the needs of
refugees was to place them in refugee camps outside of Europe’s borders (Dunn 6). In doing so,
these countries technically fulfilled their obligations to provide for refugees, but without all the
inconvenience of actually living among them, as the right to asylum would guarantee them if
they were to enter European territory.
The camps leave much to be desired. Typically the size of small cities, these camps are
often supplied with just the basics with which to sustain the refugees residing there (Dunn 4).
Furthermore, many camps are isolated, meaning that refugees struggle to find work, forcing them
to become even more dependent on the lackluster services provided by the camps (Dunn 2). By
effectively denying refugees the opportunity to become self-sufficient, these camps only worsen
their situations in the long term. Furthermore, these camps are typically underfunded by Western
countries, including those in the EU. At the end of 2014, Western states had funded only 25% of
the UNHCR’s appeal for aid to Syrian refugees (Dunn 6).
It is no great surprise that European governments display such a lack of interest in these
camps. After all, as stated previously, the initial purpose of these third country camps was to
fulfill those states’ duties to refugees without actually bringing them into their own borders.
However, there is yet another reason for the camps, that being their efficacy at deterring people
from crossing the European border. If people cross the border and claim asylum, they must be
granted certain rights and be permitted to undergo the process of proving their right to asylum. In
maintaining these camps, governments prevent people from even crossing the border in the first
place. Furthermore, if the crisis in one country of emigration ceases, then its emigrants can be
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returned to it from these camps (Dunn 6). This therefore distills any fears of asylum-seekers
entering European borders and not returning to their home countries after the crises there have
ended. The entire purpose of these camps is to keep asylum-seekers outside of Europe’s borders.
As such, it is fairly easy to understand why governments do not particularly care about the camps’
conditions. As long as they fulfill Europe’s needs, then their services to refugees are irrelevant.

Conclusion
The proposal for Schengen was innocuous enough. Lightened security along interior
borders of culturally close countries was an earnestly optimistic idea. However, the outcome of
this plan has been nothing short of disastrous in terms of immigration. Europe’s lackluster
immigration policies and border control routinely fail asylum-seekers and other migrants as
countries try to avert their responsibility to them. Most harmlessly, this often means the
intentional blurring of the concepts of refugee, asylum-seeker, and economic migrant.
However, this resistance manifests in more serious, sometimes more violent ways as well.
The EU’s restrictive immigration policies, which favor immigrants from Western countries,
force asylum-seekers to increasingly utilize illegal methods to enter its borders. Therefore,
asylum-seekers are often denied the rights to which they would otherwise be privy. They can, for
example, find themselves in immigration detention with non-asylum-seeking migrants.
Furthermore, immigrants who just narrowly fail to qualify for asylum can be deported to
countries where it is likely they will become targeted for persecution. This intentional twisting of
refugee law, coupled with restrictive immigration policies, only feeds into a vicious cycle of
increasing numbers of illegal immigrants and continuously heightened security at Europe’s
external borders.
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Europe’s border control is just as problematic, if not even more so, than its immigration
policies. The problem began from Schengen’s outset, when responsibility for securing
Schengen’s external borders fell disproportionately on Europe’s border countries. Arguably out
of desperation and lack of proper training, national border guards have committed a wide range
of abuses of power when dealing with immigrants, from the puncturing of migrant boats by
Greek security forces to the immediate deportations of asylum-seekers to Ukraine by Slovak
police. Ineptitude runs rampant among Europe’s border control, as evidenced by the Greek
police’s failure to fairly and knowledgeably review asylum applications.
Furthermore, the EU, through institutions such as Frontex, routinely bends refugee law in
its efforts to keep migrants outside of European territory. By picking up migrants through border
security operations, they transform asylum-seekers into felons and become able to detain them.
Additionally, their use of refugee camps deters the residents of those camps from seeking asylum
within Europe’s borders. Thus, they support these camps minimally, providing just what is
needed for residents to survive, but not thrive.
It seems unnecessary to explicitly state that Schengen had created a problem that it
cannot control. Despite all of its security arrangements, it cannot address the sheer number of
migrants entering Europe’s borders, and even when it does, it often does so through questionable
means. This has largely been the result of European governments’ refusal to fulfill their
obligations according to the Geneva Conventions, as well as ill planning and preparation on the
part of border security forces. Since the implementation of Schengen into the EU in 1997, the EU
has proven itself to be ineffective and, in some cases, dangerously incompetent in addressing the
migration crisis that Schengen has helped to create.
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Chapter Two: German Guestworkers and the Evolution of German National Identity

Introduction
Since the fall of the Nazi regime in 1945, Germany has undergone something of a
recurring identity crisis. Between the country’s division and reunification, its increasing
economic and political power in the EU, and its growing population of immigrants, the pressing
question of post-war Germany has been one of national identity. While traditionally tied to
ethnicity, German national identity has altered as the country’s population grows more diverse.
This phenomenon has manifested itself perhaps most prominently in Germany’s immigration
policies and the debates surrounding them. The contracting of labor migrants, or “guestworkers,”
after World War II instigated waves of immigration to Germany. When these migrants refused to
return to their countries of origin, instead bringing their families to the country and establishing
ethnic communities in German cities, Germany found itself with a permanent foreigner
population. The guestworker era precipitated an ongoing debate in Germany over immigration,
integration, and what it means to be German. This chapter will begin by providing an overview
of the guestworker era and its repercussions on German society and the immigration debate
within the country. It will furthermore recount the development of the debate over German
national identity after World War II and the country’s immigration policies. Finally, the chapter
will examine the integration debate in Germany, as well as immigrants’ successes and
shortcomings within a German society that is defined by competing dialogues of xenophobia and
acceptance.
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The Legacy of the Guestworker Era
In the years following World War II, much of Europe experienced a shortage of laborers.
In order to satisfy labor needs, many Western European states, including Germany, France, and
Great Britain, instigated large migrant inflows. Some of these states brought in guestworkers, or
Gastarbeiter, to participate in new labor programs, with the expectation that—as the name
“guestworker” would indicate—these workers’ residences would only be temporary. It was this
action that established these countries as “immigrant-receiving states,” as Gary P. Freeman
classifies them, as opposed to traditional immigration states (such as the US, Australia, Canada,
and New Zealand) and states that did not instigate guestworker programs, but that are now facing
large waves of immigration (such as Portugal, Spain, Italy, and Greece) (Freeman 882).
Post-World War II labor migration to Germany began on a small scale. In the early 1950s,
laborers arrived from Italy to work on German farms (Horrocks and Kolinsky 79). Through the
1950s, rates of labor migration slowly but steadily increased, partly due to the arrival of refugees
from East Germany. However, when the Berlin Wall went up in 1961, refugees from East
Germany were blocked from entering the West, and German manufacturers experienced a
serious labor shortage (Martin 35). To add to this dilemma, the birth rate in Germany had been
continuously falling in the years following the war, and even by the mid-1950s, there were
concerns in the country about a shrinking work force (Horrocks and Kolinsky 79). Furthermore,
West Germany was experiencing a trend of increasing numbers of citizens participating in whitecollar employment, rather than in the manual labor force (Horrocks and Kolinsky 80). With these
worries in mind, the German government took initiative on importing laborers from other
countries.
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Germany thus formed labor agreements with several Mediterranean countries. It had
previously established such an agreement with Italy, but in the early 1960s, Spain and Greece
joined the list as well. As the 1960s progressed, Germany created further agreements with
Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia, and Yugoslavia (Horrocks and Kolinsky 79). German
employers would request a certain number of laborers, as well as their preferred country of origin,
and if an insufficient number of German laborers were available to fill the position, then the
request was passed on to the countries involved in the agreement (Martin 35). The laborers who
arrived were typically unskilled men under 40 years of age, who arrived on 12-month contracts
(Horrocks and Kolinsky 80). Their transportation to Germany was paid for by the German Labor
Office, while their employers usually provided them with dormitories for living (Martin 35).
Unlike guestworker programs in other countries, Germany’s labor migrants enjoyed numerous
benefits. They received unemployment benefits, sickness pay, and federal holidays (Horrocks
and Kolinsky 80). For most of these laborers, working in Germany was far preferable to
remaining in their home countries.
Germany’s first major wave of immigration lasted from 1958 to 1966 (Siebert 168). After
a brief recession in 1966, nearly 500,000 guestworkers were sent home to ensure that German
laborers could get work (Martin 36). The second wave of immigration began in 1968, but
stopped in 1973 when Germany’s economy experienced an oil shock, resulting in a major
recession (Siebert 168). While short-lived, the growth of labor migration during this second
wave was enormous. While there had been less than 300,000 guestworkers in Germany in 1960,
there were 2.5 million of them in 1972, constituting 12% of Germany’s work force (Martin 35).
Furthermore, the predominant nationalities of these workers had changed from Italian to Turkish
and Yugoslavian (Martin 35). During the 1973 recession, as the perpetually popular scapegoats
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during economic hard times, guestworkers came under the scrutiny of the public eye (Freeman
886). The government halted recruitment in 1973, but despite public pressure, it did not deport
the guestworkers (Horrocks and Kolinsky 82). In fact, the government, led by the Social
Democratic Party (SPD), declared that “no legally employed foreign worker…shall be forced to
return home” (Joppke 284). The government did, for its part, try to pressure manufacturers to
stop hiring guestworkers. In February 1973, the government announced that the recruitment fee
would raise from 350 Deutsche Marks per worker to 1,000 Deutsche Marks in the September of
that year. Unwilling to lose such cheap labor, employers hired more than 500,000 foreign
laborers in the spring and summer before the change took place, a higher influx than ever before
(Martin 36). Labor migration to Germany was officially halted on November 22, 1973 (Martin
37). However, millions of foreign laborers were already there to stay.
Part of the German government’s approach to the guestworkers can be attributed
administrative rulings in the 1960s and 1970s that established certain rights for guestworkers,
and which were phrased vaguely enough in regards to deportation that local authorities could
refuse to force guestworkers out of their jurisdictions (Martin 36, Horrocks and Kolinsky 87).
Furthermore, employers found it burdensome to continuously train new employees year after
year, and thus they strongly favored hiring laborers past their contracts’ expiration dates (Martin
36). An additional reason for the government’s reluctance to deport guestworkers is the country’s
pride over its post-WWII history of defending human rights. In the decades following World
War II—and even arguably today, as will be addressed later in the chapter—Germans sought a
sort of moral redemption for the atrocities their country had committed during the Holocaust.
Thus, the country has made a significant effort to establish and support human rights, and has
prided itself on its new legacy. This conviction has had an enormous effect on Germany’s legal
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policies over the past decades. In the view of the German government, or at least the Social
Democratic Party, which held power at the time, deporting the guestworkers would have violated
the dignity of those individuals, which Article 1 of Germany’s Basic Law declares to be
“untouchable” (Joppke 284). Thus, the recession did not justify the deportation of the
guestworkers.
While the recruitment ended in 1973, immigration to Germany did not. Christian Joppke
describes European family immigration as distinct in that it recognizes the inherent right of
immigrants to bring their spouses and children with them (Joppke 281). By the time the
Anwerbestopp, or the stop to recruitment, was implemented, 60% of guestworkers had already
brought their families to Germany (Horrocks and Kolinsky 91). The aforementioned rulings of
the 1960s, which secured rights for guestworkers, had declared that dependents could join their
guestworker family members in Germany, so long as those family members had been employed
for one year and had “suitable housing” (Martin 36). By accepting the family members of
guestworkers, Germany continued to bring more immigrants into its borders. Furthermore, the
settlement of these families in Germany discouraged guestworkers from only remaining for a
short period time, as had been the original agreement (Carr 21). Regardless of Germany’s plan
for the guestworker program to be strictly temporary, by the 1970s, permanent ethnic minorities
had been formed in Germany (Freeman 892). The guestworkers were there to stay.
Gary P. Freeman identifies three popularly held beliefs that have emerged from legacy of
Germany’s guestworker era. The first of these is that, just like the guestworker program, any
temporary labor programs will result in more migrants settling permanently in the country. The
second conviction is that new migrants to the country will largely come from outside of Europe’s
borders. The third is that the state is incapable of controlling borders and managing immigration,
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as evidenced by the German government’s failure to fully halt immigration during the 1973
recession, much less return the guestworkers to the countries of origin (Freeman 890). The
guestworker program left a bitter taste in the mouths of many German citizens.
Thus, much like other Western European countries, there is an inherent skepticism among
Germans concerning immigration and labor programs. This can partially explain some Germans’
current worries about immigration, such as that people are immigrating for benefits rather than
because of persecution in their home countries, referred to as “social welfare migration” (Siebert
169). However, these worries have not deterred Germany’s government from continuing other
recruitment programs, largely due to the country’s struggle to produce enough of its own
qualified individuals for highly specialized fields. The Green Card program, for example, which
began in 2001, invited IT professionals to come to work in Germany. This program, which will
be elaborated upon later in this chapter, is different from the guestworker program in that it
aimed to bring in highly specialized workers for permanent residence in the country. However, it
represents a continuing trend; due to the combination of a low birth rate and an aging work force,
Germany’s economy increasingly depends on the influx of foreign workers to support its
industries.
The legacy of the guestworker era is marked by division. On one hand, many German
citizens are skeptical of immigration, particularly their own government’s ability—or lack
thereof—to control it. On the other hand, the German government is still open to welcoming
specialized workers into the country, largely due to its own shrinking work force. Adding to the
divide is Germany’s pride over its legacy of human rights and many Germans’ desire to defend
that legacy. One of Germany’s great struggles today, arising predominately out of the
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guestworker era, is figuring out how to balance its labor needs and human rights ideals with the
reality of what that might mean for immigration.

German Identity: Who is a German?
The question at the center of Germany’s immigration policies is that of what constitutes
the German identity. During the country’s years under National Socialism—and to an extent,
even before that—German identity was rooted in ethnicity and culture. Any person born of
German blood was unquestionably German, regardless of where he or she was born or raised. In
the years following the fall of the Third Reich, Germany has struggled to reconcile itself with its
past. During this process, divisions have emerged within German society over what its new
identity should mean, a debate that becomes increasingly relevant as the country witnesses
expanding multiculturalism within its borders. As the ideology of “German blood” grows more
outdated, Germany struggles to answer a new question: Who is a German?
As with many other European countries, Germany’s self-identity was long based in the
shared belief that there was one German ethnicity and culture. The horrors of the Holocaust most
drastically exemplify this way of thinking, as the country attempted to “purify” itself of those
who did not conform to the popular notion of German identity. Since the end of World War II,
Germany has not only attempted to atone for those atrocities, but it has even begun to reconstruct
a new self-identity as well.
This recalibration of Germany’s identity began with the “forty-fivers,” or those Germans
who had come of age around the fall of the Third Reich. While forty-fivers’ opinion of Hitler
himself was split, with some faulting other members of the Nazi Party for the horrors of the
Holocaust while others assigned blame to Hitler as well, they shared a common dislike for the
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Nazi Party (Moses 63). Additionally, they suffered a similar crisis of identity; they had been
raised under the ideology of National Socialism, with many of them having been members of the
Hitler Youth, and the end of the War triggered the dissolution of the ideals they had been brought
up with from the brutal reality of Nazi Germany. In this aftermath, many forty-fivers developed a
shared conviction: they could not allow such events to happen again (Moses 57). This conviction,
however, was not driven by new ideals of humanitarianism. Rather, forty-fivers generally
emphasized their own victimhood under the Nazi regime, overlooking the suffering of the
victims of the Holocaust (Moses 68). Thus began an ideology of remembrance in Germany, but
not one of repentance.
The promotion of human rights in Germany began with the “sixty-eighters,” the
generation that came immediately after the forty-fivers and who were so named for their
widespread involvement in the 1968 student uprisings in Europe. The sixty-eighters were notably
more moralistic than their predecessors and refused to empathize with their parents’ experiences
under the Nazi regime, choosing instead to distance themselves from what they viewed as a
tarnished national legacy (Moses 60). In addition to this division between the forty-fivers and
sixty-eighters, the forty-fivers were critical of the younger generation’s moralistic idealism, as it
reminded them of their own experiences with utopianism as part of the Hitler Youth (Moses 64).
The clash between the two generations exemplify a seemingly irreparable divide in post-World
War II German thought: the forty-fivers wanted to remember their suffering under the Third
Reich, while the sixty-eighters sought to escape that legacy. Furthermore, while the forty-fivers
remained politically benign or inactive, the sixty-eighters were actively involved in trying to
effect political and social change in Germany.
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These two thought processes came together with the emergence of the “non-German
Germans” in the 1950s. These non-German Germans converged the forty-fivers’ painful
memories of life under the Nazi regime with the sixty-eighters’ extreme aversion to any sort of
nostalgia for that time. The result, for the non-German Germans, was a philosophy that rejected
nationalist ideals (Moses 105). Their thought processes were fueled by the manner in which
former Nazis easily integrated back into German society after the war, as well as the lack of
remorse shown by a number of pro-Nazi thinkers (Moses 110). For example, Jürgen Habermas,
the unofficial leader of the non-German German movement, broke off from his mentor, Martin
Heidegger, whom he viewed as unwaveringly unapologetic for his support of the Nazis (Moses
111). Furthermore, a strong wave of anticommunist sentiment in West Germany gave ex-Nazis a
window of opportunity to slip past judgment for their actions and reintegrate themselves into
society (Moses 113). Watching this unfold, the non-German Germans sought to reinvent the
German identity through the absolute rejection of nationalism.
This rejection of nationalism required that the German people become critical of all
traditional notions of national identity in Germany. Only those traditions that were compatible
with democratic constitutionalism could be perpetuated (Moses 231). By rejecting traditional
national identity, these non-German Germans promoted one that “could only be procedural,
enabling a tolerant pluralism of other, non-German cultures” (Moses 235). In their view, German
identity must be based solely in law, rather than in culture or ethnicity. As far as this philosophy
applied to immigrants, it meant that German society could not require them to fully assimilate
into German culture while abandoning their own. The only requirement that could be asked of
them was to cooperate with the German political processes (Moses 237). It was the non-German
Germans’ welcoming approach to multiculturalism that shaped nationality law in the 21st century.
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Until 2000, Germany granted citizenship exclusively under the principle of jus sanguinis,
or “right of blood” (Frölich 476). Not unlike some of its European neighbors, such as Italy and
France, this meant that only those who could prove German ancestry could attain citizenship. As
the turn of the century neared, this policy lost popularity. This can be partially attributed to
Germans’ wariness of policies resembling those enacted under National Socialism, which wholly
embraced the concept of jus sanguinis (Frölich 476). Furthermore, Germany’s immigration law
allowed for an enormous influx of immigrants from Eastern Europe, many of whom had no
cultural or linguistic connections to Germany. Meanwhile, children of guestworkers and other
long-term foreign residents, who had grown up surrounded by German culture and language and
who identified as German, could not gain citizenship (Convey and Kupszewski 953). These
factors led to widespread dissatisfaction with Germany’s nationality law.
In 2000, German nationality law changed to reflect its increasingly multicultural
population. First of all, foreigners who had resided in Germany for at least eight years, who
could support themselves financially, and who had no criminal record could gain citizenship.
Furthermore, anyone born in Germany received automatic citizenship provided that one parent
was born in the country, had resided there for at least eight years, or had an unlimited residence
permit (Siebert 176). This allowed for the aforementioned children of immigrants, who spoke
German and identified with German culture, to become citizens of the nation in which they were
raised. Additionally, and as will be discussed later, these changes to German nationality law
brought into question whether Germany was an ethnic nation or an immigrant one.
Further fueling this question were Germany’s post-2000 immigration programs. As
mentioned previously, Germany introduced the Green Card in 2001. This program, which was
created in response to a shortage of skilled professionals at German companies, invited IT

34
workers to come to work in Germany (Jacoby 9). This program lasted until 2004, although it was
not Germany’s last attempt to attract STEM professionals (Siebert 173). In 2005, Germany’s
immigration law established new visas for highly skilled professionals in the science, technology,
and engineering fields (Jacoby 10). In addition, the law stated that the German government
would provide 600 hours of German language instruction to new immigrants (Jacoby 9). With
these changes to the law, Germany not only invited new workers in; it set out to integrate them
as well.
Some population statistics provide ample reasoning for the German government’s actions.
As mentioned in the earlier section, Germany has a rapidly aging population. By 2050,
Germany’s population is expected to decrease from 82 million to 60 million (Frölich 479). By
2020 alone, over 50% of the country’s workers will be over 50 years old. Already, 70% of
German companies have reported difficulties finding skilled laborers, a shortage that costs the
country $20 billion each year. To make matters worse, even Germany’s highly skilled foreign
students do not stay after graduation. Of the 60,000 students who come to Germany each year,
only 6,000 remain in the country after graduating. Additionally, Germany’s employment visas,
much like its Green Card program, brought in far fewer professionals than intended (Jacoby 10).
Should these trends continue, Germany is projected to experience a pension crisis as soon as
2020 (Frölich 479). Regardless of whether Germans want more immigrants, their government
has not been offered much of a choice: to maintain the health of its economy, the country must
continue to accept new immigrants.
While Germany’s need for immigrants is rather self-evident, its citizens’ attitudes
towards immigrants is an issue all its own. Despite Germany’s large immigrant population,
Angela Merkel stated in 2010 that multiculturalism had failed in Germany (Jacoby 8). How

35
could Germany, a country so proud of its postwar human rights record that it even refused to
deport guestworkers, experience such a failure? Harald Bauder identifies an ongoing debate in
Germany revolving around the question of whether Germany is an ethnic nation or an immigrant
one (Bauder 161). One might suppose the answer would be obvious, considering that 20% of
German residents are either first or second-generation immigrants (Jacoby 13). However, not all
Germans are in agreement. In 2000, 76% of Germans reported that they believed Germany was
an immigration country (Bauder 163). This high percentage exists despite the fervent attempts of
conservative politicians to dispel the idea of Germany as an immigrant nation in the 1990s.
(Bauder 164) However, in a poll conducted just two years later, 50% of Germans were against
the arrival of new immigrants (Bauder 165). The most likely explanation for this discrepancy is
that Germans believe that Germany has become an immigrant nation, but still desire an end to
immigration.
Germans’ reluctance to accept immigrants can be attributed to several factors. One of
these is that a disproportionate amount of immigrants are unemployed compared to the general
population. Between 1994 and 2004, foreign-born men and women had unemployment rates of
16.4% and 14.7%, respectively. In comparison, the unemployment rates for native-born men and
women were 9.3% and 9.2% (Lancee 50). Additionally, as of 2005, they comprised 22.1% of
social welfare benefits recipients, a percentage greater than their own percentage in the German
population (Siebert 171). These statistics have fueled considerable animosity towards immigrants
among low income Germans, who compete with them for jobs and housing. For this reason,
Horst Siebert identifies more xenophobia in eastern Germany, which continues to suffer higher
rates of unemployment, than in the west (Siebert 170). In a sentiment heard time and again by
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populations around the world, many native Germans are concerned that immigrants will take
resources and jobs away from them.
Furthermore, immigrants and their children have struggled to keep up with the educative
and employment success of ethnic Germans. For example, in 2009, only 9% of high school
students from Turkish families passed the test that permitted them to attend university. In
comparison, 19% of ethnic German students passed. Additionally, while two-thirds of young
Germans attend vocational training programs, “only a quarter of youth with immigration
backgrounds are enrolled” (Jacoby 13). Whereas some commentators might allege that
immigrants come from less educated backgrounds, it is important to note the xenophobia that
exists within German institutions. In 2015, for instance, two economists from the University of
Konstanz submitted identical resumés to employers under German and Turkish names. The
applications submitted under German names received a greater callback rate than those
submitted under Turkish names (Jacoby 13). Many immigrants report that they feel as if they
will never be fully accepted into German society. Tamar Jacoby suggests that this may be part of
the reason why immigrant workers do not stay for long in Germany; they worry that the schools
and will fail their children. Meanwhile, university graduates are concerned that they may face
discrimination in the German workplace, and thus choose to return to their countries of origin
(Jacoby 13). While it appears that immigrants and their descendants are typically willing to
become an equal part of German society, there is a deeply embedded xenophobia in German
society that prevents them from doing so.
There is another facet to this xenophobia, however. Likely due to Germany’s Turkish
population, which comprises the largest ethnic minority in the country, many Germans correlate
immigration with the arrival of more Muslims. Bauder states that “between 2002 and 2006
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Bundestag debates associated immigration far more frequently with Muslim populations than
with any other ethnic or origin group” (Bauder 167). In these debates, Bauder writes, the Islamic
faith was often presented as “incompatible with Germany’s secular democracy” (Bauder 167).
German xenophobia has a particular stronghold in Islamaphobia. In 1995, 40% of
Germans viewed German Muslims as a threat; in 2006, most likely influenced by 9/11 and
similar terrorist attacks, this number had risen to 55%. Meanwhile, 42% of Germans feared that
there were terrorists among the German Muslim population (Bauder 167). These Islamaphobic
sentiments carry over onto the floors of political institutions as well. In 2010, The Commissioner
for Foreigners at the Thuringian Ministry of Social Affairs, Family and Health, Eckehard Peters,
was sent into early retirement after he distributed a book called Good Bye Mohammed at
ministries and schools (Malik 496). Other polls have suggested that there are further
preconceived notions of Islam among the German population; 90% of them, for instance, believe
that Islam is discriminatory towards women (Bauder 176). These beliefs exemplify a certain
amount of ignorance and fear among the German population and provide insight to their attitudes
towards immigrants as a whole.
There exists within German society a concept of “otherness” in regard to Muslims.
Muslims are often viewed as belonging to a disparate culture that is simply incompatible with
German society and its values. This concept is particularly evident in German immigration
debates, which, at least under the CDU, emphasize the importance of Christian values (Bauder
176). Despite the efforts of Habermas’ non-German Germans, a considerable amount of German
national identity is still based in traditionally German culture and Christianity.
There is additionally a popular belief that immigrants, particularly the Turkish
community, are reluctant to integrate into German society (Bauder 175). In 1999, following a
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decade of demands by conservatives that foreigners integrate, Günther Beckstein, Bavaria’s
minister of the interior, suggested that a Leitkultur, or “dominant culture,” should be adopted by
German society and that immigrants should conform to it (Bauder 177, Manz 483). What ensued
was a national debate that lasted for two years.
Liberals argued that the concept of Leitkultur was too similar to the values of the Nazi
regime, which emphasized the German people as a Volk with a common culture, ethnicity, and
future (Manz 483). Regardless of the efforts of the non-German Germans, this sentiment—
though not as widespread as it was under Third Reich—is still very much alive in Germany.
Even in 1996, a poll demonstrated that 25% of Germans disapproved of marriages between
Germans and foreigners living in the country, but considered ethnic Germans whose families had
resided elsewhere for generations, such as those emigrating from the USSR, to be members of
the national community (Bauder 166). Paul Spiegel, chairman of the Central Council for the
Jews in Germany, recalled the ideology of Volk in the Nazi regime when he commented, “What
is all this twaddle about Leitkultur? Is chasing up foreigners, setting fire to synagogues, killing
homeless people part of German Leitkultur?” (Manz 486).
Other leaders of religious minority groups, such as Nadeem Elyas, chairman of the
moderate Central Council of Muslims in Germany, criticized the concept as well. Elyas
expressed concerns that Leitkultur was simply a “catchword,” which could be misused by far
right, xenophobic groups (Manz 485). Hilmar Hoffman, the president of the Goethe Institute, a
worldwide German language school, commented on the pointlessness of even suggesting that
there could be a dominant culture, writing, “Cultures and ways of life do not resemble static
structures and that every attempt at regulating culture must be futile as it is subject to the
dynamics of societal processes” (Manz 487). In effect, German culture was bound to change; to
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try to stop this change—to try to preserve some idealized, outdated image of the country—was
not merely morally wrong, but altogether impossible.
A popular argument during the debate centered around the Americanization of German
culture. Critics of Leitkultur maintained that due to the enormous influx of American media and
products, German culture was already irreversibly Americanized. Stefan Manz details the unfair
pedestal that Leitkultur put immigrants upon, as he writes, “Whilst the young elites diffuse into a
global Americanism, it should now be the Africans, Turks and Indians who are sworn into a
German ‘remainder-culture’ and act as its conservators. The ostracized foreigners were therefore
not only supposed to save the German social system but also its culture” (Manz 487). According
to Manz, the culture promoted by Leitkultur had long been gone from Germany. If Germans had
abandoned that culture, it was unreasonable to expect immigrants to rebuild and maintain it.
While the Leitkultur campaign simmered out after two years, the demand for foreigners
to integrate was widespread in Germany. In a 1996 poll, 60% of Germans supported greater
assimilation of foreigners into German society (Bauder 179). Furthermore, the same nationality
law that had opened the doors to citizenship for immigrants additionally required that they learn
German (Bauder 177). Under the Christian Democratic Union, the non-German Germans’ hopes
for a strictly political national identity, unfettered by cultural or linguistic traditions, have
floundered.
A primary reason for this persisting conception of “otherness” is that Muslims are often
viewed as a single, homogeneous group. This, of course, overlooks the many cultural, historical,
and generational differences, among others, that make the Muslim community in Germany so
diverse. Jamal Malik identifies this notion in a 2005 coalition agreement between the CDU and
the SPD, which calls for a “dialogue with Islam” (Malik 500). Malik writes:
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“The expression ‘Dialogue with Islam’ already indicates that the state ‘creates’ its
discussion partners in search for a single representative organ, which can speak
for every Muslim. This is based on the implicit assumption that there is a problem,
an incompatibility that can threaten the desired and intended peaceful interaction
between the dialogue partners, if it is not resolved.” (Malik 500)
In addition to regarding the Muslim community as a homogeneous group with the same interests,
the coalition indicates that a failure to integrate would result in dangerous consequences. In its
attempt to reconcile two cultures, this assumption only works to highlight the perceived divide
between them.
Malik highlights the distinctions between three generations of migrants. The first
generation is typically resistant to integrate into German culture. In contrast, their secondgeneration children do integrate, though they do not seek out upward mobility to the same extent
as the third generation. Members of the third generation largely identify as German and often
intend to better their living standards within German society (Malik 500). By regarding the
German Muslim community as a homogeneous group, the German government overlooks the
nuanced nature of its generational differences. While first generation migrants are often resistant
to integrate, the third generation already identifies as German; it can perhaps be argued that by
perpetuating this concept of otherness, the German government only pushes this third generation
to the fringes of German society, thereby creating the very dilemma it had sought to eliminate in
the first place.
Regardless of the matter of integration, the influence of immigrants on German society
cannot be overlooked. From Mesut Özil, who helped lead the German national team to victory in
the 2014 World Cup, to Fatih Akin, the prominent director of such films as Im Juli and Gegen
die Wand, which notably feature German-Turkish characters, the Turkish population in Germany
has produced a number of cultural icons. Meanwhile, Düsseldorf boasts a sizable Japanese
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population and celebrates Japan Day each year and Vietnamese-Buddhist temples can be found
throughout the country. Perhaps the greatest expression of this mixing of cultures is that of one
of Germany’s most popular fast foods, the döner kebab, which combines a classic Turkish dish
with popular German flavors, such as red cabbage. Each year, some 720 million servings of
döner kebab are sold nationally (Angelos 2012). While the debate over integration continues, one
fact is irrevocable: immigrants have left an indelible mark on German culture and society.
This discussion over integration, of course, brings to question whether integration is even
necessary in the first place. From the perspective of the non-German Germans, the concept of
asking immigrants to integrate into German culture is both absurd and unacceptable. In their
view, there can be no national identity other than a political one; to declare a Leitkultur and
request that immigrants conform to it would be to mirror the tenets of National Socialism. For
other Germans, integration is a necessity for the continuation of German society and culture. The
issue at hand is not, as they argue, one of ethnicity, but rather one of incompatible values
between two disparate cultures. Harald Bauder, however, calls this expectation that immigrants
will assimilate “inconceivable,” arguing that immigrants will inevitably continue to hold on to
aspects of their own cultures (Bauder 168). If assimilation is such an unrealistic option, then the
debate must return to the matter of immigration. If Germany means to fully reject and amend for
its Nazi past, must it continue to accept immigrants who refuse to abandon their own histories
and cultures in favor of a Leitkultur? Or is the very concept of a Leitkultur too reminiscent of the
ideals of National Socialism? These are among the questions that frame the debate over German
national identity today. As the debate continues, the fact remains that Germany continues to be
an increasingly multicultural society. It is only up to the German people to decide whether to
accept these changes or not.
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Conclusion
As the Third Reich crumbled in 1945, so too did the ethnically homogeneous image of
German national identity that it had promoted. Out of that shattered image, German thinkers and
common people alike sought for a new national identity on new terms, one which would spare
them from repeating the travesties that had defined the Third Reich. For some, such as the fortyfivers, this drive was focused on their own suffering during the Nazi regime. For the sixtyeighters, this new national identity would be based in an outright rejection of the past and a firm
promotion of human rights. These differing stances would merge in the philosophy of the nonGerman Germans, who rejected nationalism in favor of a German identity that was defined
solely by law, rather than by a common culture or ethnicity.
Philosophy and the actual implementation of that philosophy into political reality are two
different things, however. In some aspects, the non-German Germans’ purely legal approach to
German nationality made strides of progress into the 21st century. It opened the door to
citizenship for the children of guestworkers and other immigrants, who had grown up in
Germany and were linguistically and culturally German. Moreover, the German government
sought to facilitate the integration of new immigrants through various means, including the
provision of German language instruction. Although Germany’s government has appeared to be
supportive of new immigrants, racism has persisted in German society. In school and the
workplace, racist—and particularly Islamaphobic—attitudes have limited immigrants and their
descendants’ opportunities for success. Meanwhile, many Germans, regardless of their positions
on immigration, maintain that immigrants must integrate into German society, thereby refusing
to even acknowledge the possibility that the integration must be mutually enacted. This spurred
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the debate over Leitkultur, which for some Germans was a logical part of integration. For others,
it echoed too closely the violent ideology of National Socialism.
It is debates such as that of Leitkultur that continue to shape the evolution of German
national identity. At the center of those debates are the issues of immigration and
multiculturalism, which call Germans to reconsider those qualities that define them. Is the pre2000 immigrant from Eastern Europe, who can trace his or her ethnicity to Germany, but who
understands little of German language or culture a German? What of the children of immigrants,
who already identify as German and who were brought up through the German school system
with their German peers? Perhaps most pressingly, where in this process of determining true
German identity does the debate begin to incorporate the same ideas that allowed for the rise of
National Socialism? German society is fractured over the topic of multiculturalism. Some
Germans are in favor of the non-German Germans’ purely political concept of national identity,
which welcomes immigrants and promotes human rights ideals. For other Germans, those ideals
of inclusion and acceptance represent a new German national identity that they neither recognize
nor approve. Thus, they cling to traditional notions of German national identity, such as shared
ethnicity or culture. The debate over German national identity pits those who support the
traditional concept of national identity against those who reject the traditional concept as just
another racist ideal of National Socialism.
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Chapter Three: Germany and the Current Refugee Crisis

Introduction
Since 2014, conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East have brought large inflows of
asylum-seekers streaming into Europe. Germany has not only accepted the greatest amount of
these asylum-seekers, but it has additionally pushed for other EU member states to accept more
asylum-seekers, earning it an international reputation as a leading proponent of human rights in
the European Union. There is, of course, significant controversy both in the EU and within
Germany itself regarding the Merkel government’s position on the asylum-seekers. This chapter
will examine the politics and conflicting views surrounding the current crisis. The first section
will review the history of asylum policies in Germany following World War II. The chapter will
then provide an overview of Europe’s migrant crisis, focusing especially on the opposing views
in the EU regarding the crisis, particularly between Western European and Eastern European
states. The chapter will additionally detail Germany’s leadership role in the crisis and the
political debates in the country regarding its massive inflow of asylum-seekers. Germany’s
acceptance of so many asylum-seekers and its promotion of human rights in the European Union
have brought it international praise as a hero in the EU, but the details—as details typically do—
provide a more complicated image of a nation that is itself divided over its approach to the crisis.

Asylum in Germany
The right of asylum was first established in Article 16 of the West German Constitution
in 1949. The article stated, “Persons persecuted on political grounds shall have the right of
asylum” (BPB 2015). Through the 1970s, the majority of asylum-seekers were fleeing Eastern
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bloc states. At the end of the 1970s, however, a military coup in Turkey and martial law in
Poland caused a sharp spike in the number of asylum-seekers in Germany, with 200,000
applications filed from 1979 to 1981 alone. Due to the rising number of asylum-seekers, the
German government amended the asylum process in an attempt to make the country appear less
desirable to asylum-seekers. They made it more difficult to appeal against negative decisions,
required visas for those fleeing particular countries, disallowed applicants to work for the first
year while their applications were being processed, and reduced social benefits for asylumseekers (BPB 2015). This, they hoped, would deter asylum-seekers from entering Germany.
However, the number of asylum claims continued to rise in the 1980s, prompting the
CDU and CSU to push for an amendment to the Constitution, which would increase restrictions
on the right of asylum. However, the SPD and the Free Democrats (FDP) opposed this
movement, and without a two-thirds majority, the Constitution could not be amended. As the
number of asylum claims rose, so too did suspicion that many asylum claimants were merely just
economic refugees (BPB 2015). From 1991 to 1992, 60,000 people were entering Germany each
month, peaking after fall of the Iron Curtain in 1992, at which point three-quarters of all asylum
applications being processed in the EU were registered in Germany (Convey and Kupszewski
957, BPB 2015). This was enough for a compromise among Germany’s political parties, who on
December 6, 1992, amended Article 16 of the Constitution. While this compromise could be
attributed to the spike in incoming refugees after the fall of the Iron Curtain, it is perhaps of
significance to note that after German reunification in 1990, there was no longer any need or
desire for the West German government to facilitate the asylum-seeking process for refugees
from East Germany, whom they considered to be unequivocally part of the German people.
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The 1992 amendment introduced the concept of “safe third countries,” those which are in
accordance with the Geneva Refugee Convention and European Convention on Human Rights,
such as Norway. If deemed necessary or appropriate, Germany can send asylum-seekers to these
safe third countries instead of keeping them within its own borders. The amendment additionally
identified “safe countries of origin,” which are states that do not pose a risk of political
persecution or humiliating treatment. As of March 2015, Germany considers all of the EU,
Ghana, Senegal, Serbia, Macedonia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to be safe countries of origin.
Asylum-seekers from those countries have fewer opportunities to appeal negative decisions than
do other asylum-seekers. Additionally, the Asylum-Seekers’ Benefits Act established a social
security system for asylum-seekers that included fewer or less generous benefits than that of
citizens (Siebert 169, BPB 2015). In 1994, asylum-seekers lost all social welfare benefits.
Instead, asylum-seekers are given housing and coupons for food. Asylum-seekers may only
receive social welfare benefits if the asylum procedure lasts for over three years (Siebert 171).
Until asylum is granted, asylum-seekers are not permitted to travel freely throughout the state. In
some cities, their freedom of mobility is restricted to a mere six square miles (Carr 135). As long
as the asylum process continues, asylum-seekers are restricted financially and in terms of
mobility.
Once asylum is granted, people are granted a temporary residence permit and are
“entitled to social welfare, child benefits, child-raising benefits, integration allowances and
language courses” (BMI 2016). If asylum is not granted, the Federal Office for Migration and
Refugees (BAMF), which reviews asylum applications, determines whether there are grounds for
prohibiting deportation of the asylum-seeker. If not, then the asylum-seeker must leave Germany
(BMI 2016). The restrictions for asylum-seekers have increased markedly since 1949, as the
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German government has attempted to curb the rising number of people entering the country’s
borders. Therefore, Germany’s role in the current refugee crisis represents a fascinating contrast
to its own policies.

The Current Migrant Crisis
Over the past few years, the number of refugees coming to Germany and other European
countries has been steadily rising. However, that increase has steepened rapidly since 2014, in
the wake of conflicts in North Africa and the Middle East (Tomkiw 2015). In the six months
between January and July of 2015, 438,000 people applied for asylum in the European Union,
compared to 571,000 in all of 2014 (BBC News 2015, “Migrant crisis: Why EU deal on refugees
is difficult”). The majority of people crossing Europe’s borders are asylum-seekers fleeing war in
Syria and Afghanistan and violence under a corrupt government in Afghanistan (Tomkiw 2015).
Since 2011, The Syrian civil war alone has displaced more than 4 million people, according the
UNHRC (Tomkiw 2015). Europe has become an attractive destination for refugees for several
reasons. For one, camps in Lebanon and Turkey have become overpopulated and refugees have
been forced to look for safety elsewhere. Due to its proximity to the Middle East and North
Africa and its relative economic stability, Europe has become the preferred option for many
refugees (Tomkiw 2015).
European countries have responded to the crisis in different ways. While Germany has
been lauded for its policy of Willkommenskultur, or “welcome culture,” other countries, such as
Hungary, have expressed greater resistance to accepting or even aiding refugees (Smith-Spark
2015). Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has become a sort of figurehead of the antirefugee movement in Europe, and in 2015, his country even constructed a four-meter high fence
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along its border with Serbia to prevent refugees from entering (BBC News 2015, “Migrant crisis:
Germany starts temporary border controls”). Furthermore, Hungary has faced accusations of
poor treatment of refugees in camps and train stations (Smith-Spark 2015, Bennhold and Eddy
2015). Hungary has placed blame for these complaints on Germany, as it is one of the primary
destinations for refugees, for reasons that will be explained later (Smith-Spark 2015, GrahamHarrison et al. 2015).
Anti-refugee sentiment is rife within Eastern Europe, often intermingling with
Islamaphobia. Just this past February, a conservative Polish magazine, wSieci (“The Network”)
pictured a blonde woman wrapped in a European Union flag being assaulted by numerous men
on its cover. The headline read, “The Islamic rape of Europe” (Sherwood 2016). One article in
the magazine says of the sexual assaults in Cologne, which will be detailed later, “The first signs
that things were going wrong, however, were there a lot earlier. They were still ignored or were
minimized in significance in the name of tolerance and political correctness” (Sherwood 2016).
This article is just one representation of the anti-refugee sentiment that has dictated many Eastern
European governments’ policies through the course of the migrant crisis.
A September 2015 EU commission has only worsened political relations within Europe
in regards to this crisis. Identifying 120,000 refugees to relocate throughout the EU, the
commission established mandatory refugee quotas in each of its 28 member states. Only refugees
from Syria, Iraq, and Eritrea qualify for the plan, and groups such as unaccompanied children
and rape victims are prioritized (BBC News 2015, “Migrant crisis: Why EU deal on refugees is
difficult”). While some countries, such as the UK and Denmark, have pushed for an option for
countries to opt out from the plan, others have outright rejected it. Most of these countries, which
include Hungary and Slovakia, are part of Eastern Europe, highlighting a regional divide within
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the EU. When Germany introduced new immigration controls to manage the crisis, Prime
Minister Orbán expressed support for them, calling them “necessary to protect German and
European values” (BBC News 2015, “Migrant crisis: Germany starts temporary border
controls”). Moreover, other countries, such as Poland and the Czech Republic, have expressed
willingness to take in more refugees, but oppose the mandatory quotas (Eddy et al. 2015). The
EU has grown increasingly fragmented as its member states vehemently disagree with one
another in regards to how best to handle this crisis.
A particularly troubling development in the EU’s handling of the crisis has arisen in
March 2016, as the EU and Turkey have considered a deal that would enable the EU to send
asylum-seekers back to Turkey, while providing more money to Turkey and visa-free travel for
its citizens (Nebehay and Baczynska 2016). Under the terms of the “one in, one out” deal,
Turkey would accept one Syrian asylum-seeker in Greece for every Syrian accepted by the EU.
In addition to being illegal under the Geneva Conventions, which forbid collective expulsions,
Turkey has a particularly poor record of human rights (Verhofstadt 2016). While the UNHCR
and human rights groups, such as Amnesty International and Doctors Without Borders, have
criticized the deal as illegal and inhumane, the EU has presented it as a part of a pragmatic
solution to an overwhelming inflow of people. Referencing the 2.7 million Syrian refugees taken
in by Turkey, Angela Merkel said of the deal, “That’s why it’s only fair of us to ask first: can we
give Turkey a little bit of help in shouldering this task? (Nebehay and Baczynska 2016). If
finalized, this deal would represent another enormous failure on the part of the EU to uphold its
obligations to human rights and international refugee law.
In September 2015, UNHCR head António Guterres criticized Europe’s inconsistent
management of the crisis. He stated, “Europe cannot go on responding to this crisis with a
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piecemeal or incremental approach. No country can do it alone, and no country can refuse to do
its part” (UNHCR 2015, “UNHCR chief issues key guidelines for dealing with Europe’s refugee
crisis”). Guterres further established six fundamental principles in regards to the crisis. The first
of these is that this is primarily a refugee crisis, not a “migration phenomenon,” as many of those
opposed to accepting the refugees have referred to it (UNHCR 2015, “UNHCR chief issues key
guidelines for dealing with Europe’s refugee crisis”). Secondly, a common strategy must be
implemented in Europe in order to manage this crisis. Such a fragmented approach has proven
itself to be ineffective. Third, urgent measures must be taken to stabilize the situation in the long
term. Fourth, Guterres expressed support for a relocation plan such as the EU commission from
that September, stating that all EU member states must participate in a mass relocation program.
Fifth, anybody who enters the EU and is determined to not be a refugee must be returned to their
countries of origin in a manner that is efficient and which is respectful of their human rights.
Finally, Guterres identifies smugglers as dangerous criminals who must be targeted, while their
victims must be protected. In order to help this effort, Guterres says, there must be more
opportunities for people to legally enter Europe. Additionally, the conflicts and wars that are
generating this crisis must be addressed (UNHCR 2015, “UNHCR chief issues key guidelines for
dealing with Europe’s refugee crisis”).
Regardless of the UNHCR’s criticisms and suggestions, the EU has remained in a state of
disagreement over how to handle the crisis. Eastern European countries remain opposed to
accepting refugees, much less supporting a plan that would make such measures mandatory.
Western European countries, while more open to the idea of accepting refugees, have largely
resisted the quotas as well. The crisis has even thrown the very future of Schengen into question
as well. According to the rules of the Schengen Agreement, governments may suspend Schengen
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for two years, a move that Germany itself is considering amid the crisis. Furthermore, Germany,
Sweden, and Austria have criticized Greece’s handling of the crisis and have warned that Greece
could be ousted from Schengen (Traynor and Smith 2016). As governments seek to reduce the
inflow of asylum-seekers into their countries, they increasingly prioritize the security of their
own borders, casting doubt over whether Schengen may even have a long future in Europe.
As long as wars and violence continue in North Africa and the Middle East, however, it is
unlikely that the tide of refugees coming to Europe will be stemmed. Four-meter high fences and
hardline opposition to accepting refugees will not be enough to stop them from coming. The
countries of the EU must establish an effective way to manage the crisis or they will find
themselves overwhelmed by an unrelenting influx of refugees.

Germany’s Role in the Crisis
While Eastern European countries oppose refugee quotas and Western European
countries try to shirk their own responsibilities, Germany has emerged as the de facto leader of
the pro-refugee side of the debate. Having declared that it would accept all Syrian refugee
requests, regardless of where they cross into the EU—thereby suspending the Dublin
Regulation—Germany expected an inflow of 800,000 migrants before the end of 2015, the
highest of any EU member state (Graham-Harrison et al. 2015, Eddy et al. 2015). This is a
striking increase to the 127,000 people who were granted asylum in German in 2014 (Abé et al.
2014). Refugees are projected to eventually reach 1% of Germany’s overall population (Eddy
2015). With Chancellor Angela Merkel as the face of this humanitarian campaign, Germany has
begun to cement its reputation as the hero of the refugee crisis.
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Germany’s role in the crisis extends outside of its own borders, however. The country
has been an active proponent of the EU’s quota plan, advocating for EU solidarity in sharing its
burden. Merkel, who has framed the refugee crisis in a humanitarian context, has made a point of
reminding EU states that as members of the EU, they are obligated to support certain human
rights standards (BBC News 2015, “Migrant crisis: Why EU deal on refugees is difficult”).
Germany’s Interior Minister, Thomas de Maiziere, has even proposed cutting off European
Union funding to countries that oppose the quota system, as those countries presently do not face
any repercussions for their rejection of the EU plan (Deutsche Welle 2015). While it might be
partially correct to attribute Germany’s support of the quota system to its humanitarian interests,
another, more pressing reason is the country’s desire to relieve itself of the heavy burden of
accepting so many refugees on its own. Under the quota plan, Germany would still receive the
most refugees of any member state, with 40,206 coming into its borders. France would receive
the second highest number of refugees, 30,783, just over ¾ the amount going to Germany
(Deutsche Welle 2015). However, the quota system would still relieve some of Germany’s
burden, especially considering its pledge to take in all Syrian refugees.
Much like the EU, Germany has implemented a quota system within its own borders. The
Königsteiner key, so named for Königstein, the city in which it was drawn up, distributes
refugees among Germany’s states according to those states’ populations and economic power.
North Rhine-Westfalia, the most populous state, accepts the most refugees, followed by Bavaria
and Baden-Württemberg (Bennhold and Eddy 2015). For the six months to a year that their
asylum status is being reviewed, most asylum-seekers must remain in the cities in which they
applied. Once they have been granted asylum, however, “they are free to settle anywhere in the
country where they can find a job or a support system” (Bennhold and Eddy 2015). Germany’s
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quota system aims to make the process of locating refugees more efficient, though it has
experienced its share of criticism.
One criticism, though fairly minor, focuses on asylum-seekers’ inability to move freely
throughout the country. Given these restrictions, they are often unable to reunite with family or
settle in the areas of their choice—such as West Germany, which harbors less extreme antirefugee sentiment than East Germany—until they have been granted asylum (Bennhold and
Eddy 2015). However, a bigger concern is that the German government has overburdened its
states with the sheer number of refugees coming into the country. For example, Dortmund’s
main processing facility was supposed to be able to accommodate 350 refugees per day; instead,
it was forced to accommodate 1,500 refugees per day before Germany’s borders were even
opened (Smale 2015). As a result, Dortmund’s community center has been opened to help
manage the inflow of refugees, taking on 1,100 volunteers and interpreters to pick up the extra
work. Additionally, the schools in Dortmund’s state, North Rhine-Westphalia, expect to enroll
40,000 refugee children during the 2015-2016 school year, requiring the state to hire more than
3,600 new teachers. As of September 2015, North Rhine-Westphalia had accepted 144,000 of a
projected national 800,000 asylum-seekers (Smale 2015). As Dortmund city spokesman Michael
Meinders said of the repurposing of infrastructure and even the German Army to address the
needs of refugees, “It works—just—but under immense pressure. Dortmund really can’t go on
like this” (Smale 2015). Furthermore, the German government is expected to spend $2-3.7
billion on refugees in 2016 (Eddy 2015). Germany’s acceptance of refugees has placed a heavy
burden on its states, which some fear may increase intolerance towards refugees in the country.
However, Germany has additionally faced criticism for not doing enough to help refugees.
For instance, while Germany has taken in the most refugees of any EU member state, those
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refugees do not make up a significant portion of its population. While they are projected to
comprise 1% of Germany’s population, their numbers are still far below that. Meanwhile,
smaller states, such as Malta and Sweden “take in three times as many refugees as Germany
does,” relative to their populations (Abé et al. 2014). Further criticism was aimed at Germany in
September 2015, when the country temporarily reinstated border controls with Austria to “help
authorities process asylum-seekers in a more orderly manner” (Deutsche Welle 2015). This
move forced hundreds of migrants to sleep overnight in a car park in Austria (Eddy et al. 2015).
While the German government has worked to promote a humanitarian approach to the migrant
crisis, shortcomings such as these exemplify the great strain the country is under. Considering
this, it is no great surprise that Germany has pushed for the implementation of the EU
commission, in the hopes that other countries may take up the weight of its burden.

Reactions Within Germany
Political opinion in Germany is divided over refugee policy. The Social Democratic Party
(SPD), which is a “junior partner in Merkel’s ‘grand coalition,’” supports Merkel’s decision to
accept more refugees (Nienaber 2015). Secretary-General Yasmin Fahimi of the SPD, for
example, echoed Merkel’s humanitarian stance when she remarked, “We had to give a strong
symbol of humanity to show that Europe’s values are valid also in difficult times. Hungary’s
handling of the crisis is unbearable” (Nienaber 2015). The SPD Mayor of Hamburg, Olaf Scholz,
has additionally requested a more liberal visa policy, despite the burdens already placed on
German states (Abé et al. 2014).
Meanwhile, Bavaria’s conservative Christian Social Union (CSU) has taken a strong
stance against accepting more refugees. Andreas Scheuer, general secretary for the CSU, has
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stated that Germany “cannot carry the weight of the entire world’s pain” (Abé et al. 2014).
Instead, the CSU has emphasized focusing on problems in Africa in an effort to stem the
migration. However, as the non-governmental organization ONE has noted, since 2013,
Germany has cut more development spending in Africa than any other donor country. Although
Germany has pledged €100 million to Africa, German newspaper Der Spiegel has acknowledged
this as “a damage control effort” at best (Abé et al. 2014). Additionally, the CSU has expressed
concerns over the financial burden of accepting so many refugees, with Bavarian Interior
Minister Joachim Herrmann accusing Merkel of not considering the strain such numbers of
refugees would place on Germany’s states (Nienaber 2015).
Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has faced something of an identity crisis, as
its members are split between supporting Merkel’s uncharacteristic decision to accept so many
refugees and the anti-immigration stance of the CSU, their sister party. Interior Minister Thomas
de Maizière, for instance, has urged the German government to establish a limit on asylumseekers, as the temporary border controls between Germany and Austria were not enough to
“reinstate an orderly entry process” (Eddy et al. 2015). He has further recommended the creation
of “waiting zones,” places along Germany’s borders where migrants can stay until they are
granted refugee status, either in Germany or elsewhere (Eddy et al. 2015). While the CDU seeks
to support their party leader, their members have expressed concerns about the sheer number of
asylum-seekers coming into their borders. However, even Merkel is not as openly accepting as
her right-wing opposition might suggest. She has stated, “We agree that the commission should
define safe countries of origin, that European countries should join forces to help Italy and
Greece open registration centers, and that those who have no right to stay go back to their
countries of origin” (Tomkiw 2015). This statement echoes popular rhetoric among right-wing
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parties, namely that a distinct line should be drawn between refugees and economic migrants, as
well as that safe countries of origin must be recognized so that migrants can be more readily
deported from Germany.
Merkel’s rhetoric has not been sufficient for the CSU, however, who have found a sort of
spokesperson in Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. When Orbán was invited to a CSU
meeting, Bavarian state premier Horst Seehofer stated that the Prime Minister “deserves support,
not criticism. In the federal state of Bavaria, he enjoys this support” (Delcker 2015). While the
CSU supports Orbán’s stance on refugees, both the CDU and SPD considered Orbán’s invitation
to the meeting as “backstabbing” (Delcker 2015).
Outside of government, the debate over refugees has been heated as well. According to a
survey in March 2015, 1 in 3 Germans wanted their country to bring in more refugees (Abé et al.
2014). In particular, a number of Germans have expressed distaste towards Orbán’s handling of
the crisis in Hungary. The Bild am Sonntag newspaper, for example, featured a headline in
support of Merkel’s policies that read, “Merkel stops the shame of Budapest” (Nienaber 2015).
Moreover, protestors outside the CSU meeting to which Orbán was invited chanted, “Say it loud,
say it clear, refugees are welcome here” (Delcker 2015). An opinion poll in September 2015
showed that while Merkel’s approval rating has dropped, most Germans are not worried about
the inflow of refugees (Nienaber 2015).
While most Germans may not express an overt concern about the influx of refugees, far
right parties have made their voices heard in the debate. In 2014, before the number of refugees
coming into Germany began to skyrocket, tens of thousands of people were already participating
in demonstrations by Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West, an antiimmigration party popularly known as Pegida (Bennhold and Eddy 2015). Anti-immigration
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violence has become a serious issue in Germany since the crisis began to take root, with more
than 200 arson and other kinds of attacks on both migrant facilities and on migrants themselves
in the first six months of 2015 alone (Eddy 2015). These attacks have been especially
concentrated in Dresden and other cities in Eastern Germany, fueling concerns among asylumseekers that they may be placed in dangerous areas (Bennhold and Eddy 2015).
Incidents of anti-immigration sentiment and violence have only worsened in the
aftermath of widespread reports of sexual assault in Cologne on New Year’s Eve 2015. 121
women in the city filed complaints that they had been robbed or sexually assaulted, with two
submitting rape allegations (CBS News 2016, “Immigrants attacked in Germany amid backlash
over sex assaults”). 73 suspects have since been identified, most of whom are refugees, although
the German police did not distinguish refugees from asylum-seekers, who comprised a large
portion of the suspects (CBS News 2016, “Germany blames wave of sex assaults mostly on
refugees”). After the assaults, six Pakistanis and a Syrian were attacked in two separate incidents
in Cologne, with two victims requiring hospital care. In response to the assaults, Pegida
organized a 1,700-person protest outside of Cologne’s main train station, with participants
carrying banners sporting slogans such as “RAPEfugees not welcome.” Police had to keep the
Pegida protestors separated from the 1,300 counter-protestors who were in attendance as well
(CBS News 2016, “Immigrants attacked in Germany amid backlash over sex assaults”). These
latest incidents have only further ignited the fire of extremist right wing parties and have
polarized the debate in Germany.
While initially hailed as the humanitarian hero of the refugee crisis, with images and
videos of Germans warmly greeting refugees at train stations in Munich and elsewhere being
widely transmitted through international news outlets, the response of Germany’s right-wing
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party has complicated matters. Between the deep-seated xenophobia in parts of Germany,
particularly in the East, and the economic burden of accepting so many refugees, the visceral
response of the right seems almost inevitable. However, while the extremist right-wing parties
are loud, their sentiments are not universal. In The New York Times’ article, “Where the
Refugees Pour Into Germany, a 24-Hour Window,” Alison Smale describes a more positive and
hopeful sentiment in Dortmund: “’We are really proud of this because we have a bad reputation,’
said Marcus Sulk, the Fire Department officer overseeing operations at the community center.
He was alluding to the fact that Dortmund has been the home of a few vocal neo-Nazis, but he
was heartened by the volunteers working with him to welcome refugees. ‘We still have people
who can show what the German soul really is,’ he said” (Smale 2015). Overall, opinions on the
refugee crisis in Germany are varied, but most Germans appear to be accepting of the refugees
who are already there, although they remain concerned about exactly how they will
accommodate such large numbers.

Conclusion
While international media has hailed Germany as the humanitarian hero of the migrant
crisis, the truth paints a much more complex picture. While Germany’s asylum policy following
World War II was initially quite open, its government added increasing restrictions to make it
more difficult for people to claim asylum within its borders. However, Germany has nonetheless
accepted more asylum-seekers than any other country in the European Union, though it lags
behind others in the ratio of asylum-seeker-per-citizen. Furthermore, while the German
government has played a key role in pressuring other EU member states to take in more refugees,
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its reasoning for this is more likely due to the burden of the huge inflow of asylum-seekers into
its country than it is due to a fervent human rights dogma.
Additionally, Germans are hardly uniform in their support for the Merkel government’s
policies regarding asylum-seekers. Conservatives, such as the CSU, strongly oppose the
government’s acceptance of so many asylum-seekers, clinging instead to Hungarian Prime
Minister Viktor Orbàn as the spokesperson for their position. Meanwhile, liberals, such as the
SPD, have voiced support for Merkel’s policies. Stuck in the middle is Merkel’s CDU, which is
torn between its conservative values and its leader, who has proven unusually liberal in her
policies during this crisis.
Moreover, asylum-seekers face trouble among German society. While photos and videos
of Germans greeting refugees at train stations and donating food, water, and other supplies have
dominated news cycles around the world, a deep-rooted xenophobia exists within Germany as
well. Especially after the sexual assaults in Cologne, asylum-seekers and refugees are facing
increasing discrimination and violence in Germany, particularly in the east. Meanwhile, the
country finds itself strapped for resources, drawing uncertainty over how long Germany’s current
policies can continue. While Germany stands out as leading proponent for refugees in Europe,
particularly when contrasted against Eastern Europe, its government remains divided over
whether to welcome asylum-seekers or to once again increase restrictions on them, and the
tolerance of German society continues to be put to the test.
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Conclusion

Much like international refugee law, the process of reconfiguring German national
identity was shaped by the legacy of the Holocaust. In the wake of World War II, both Europe
and Germany sought to prevent the atrocities of the past from occurring again and established
rights for asylum-seekers and refugees to protect them against persecution and other human
rights abuses. While rights for refugees and asylum-seekers are secured by law, the distinction
between asylum-seekers, refugees, and economic migrants is often inherently blurry, and
politicians and other anti-immigration advocates take advantage of this ambiguity to evade their
responsibilities to uphold those rights. As Seyla Benhabib explains, this game of politics places
refugees in a “state of exception,” in which they become an unwanted, unprotected group that is
vulnerable to attack (Sierakowski 2015). Accordingly, in the long and ironic tradition of human
forgetfulness, Europe has largely failed to accept and support the enormous inflow of asylumseekers currently streaming in from North Africa and the Middle East. Germany has emerged as
the leader of the pro-refugee movement in the EU, thus building a reputation as the major human
rights proponent in the European Union. While the current popular narrative supports the image
of a Germany that is driven by a desire to protect human rights, that narrative does not accurately
depict the ongoing migration debate in Germany. German society is fractured over whether to
continue to accept asylum-seekers or to keep them out of its borders. At its basis, this is a larger
debate over whether German national identity should be defined by a support for human rights
and multiculturalism or by a more traditional, ethnically homogeneous concept.
Guided by the non-German Germans’ rejection of nationalism, post-World War II
Germany has sought a broader European identity. This shift can be evidenced by Germany’s
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strong backing of the creation of Schengen and its willingness to take a background role in the
decision-making process, so long as it meant that it would be included in the final manifestation
of the Schengen Agreement. Germany’s allegiance to a larger European identity further helps to
explain why the country has attained such a leadership role in the current refugee crisis, calling
on EU solidarity in order to maintain the concept of a broad European identity.
Germany’s participation in Schengen, its utilization of safe third countries and safe
countries of origin, and its involvement in the EU-Turkey deal demonstrate Germany’s
inconsistent record of supporting human rights. The 1992 amendment to Article 16 of Germany’s
Constitution allows Germany to send asylum-seekers to other European countries rather than
housing them itself. Schengen in general is devoted to keeping foreigners out while maintaining
open borders between European countries, further bolstering the perception of a Europe that is
united by culture and a shared future. While Germany claims to promote human rights, these
rights have often been violated as a result of Schengen, as asylum-seekers and migrants have
faced brutal deportation processes, have been mistreated by European border control forces, and
even refugees face hardship in refugee camps that are underfunded by the EU and that largely
serve the purpose of keeping refugees out of EU borders in the first place. While Schengen has
paved the way for many human rights violations, Germany has largely remained silent on the
matter, choosing instead to maintain its support of and membership in Schengen and therefore
continuing to promote EU solidarity. This is not to suggest that human rights are unimportant to
the German people; rather, it illustrates Germany’s willingness to deprioritize human rights in
favor of other interests, such as promoting a broader European identity or stemming the flow of
asylum-seekers into its borders.
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One might argue that the German government’s reluctance to deport guestworkers during
the 1973 recession is evidence of the country’s commitment to human rights. This is partially
correct. After all, the 1970s did follow the rise of the sixty-eighters and their philosophy of
human rights, which was popular enough that the government, under the left-leaning SPD, found
itself resistant to forcibly deport the guestworkers. However, another reason for the
government’s failure to deport guestworkers lies in the appeal of cheap labor to German
employers. In the 1960s and 1970s, the guestworkers were assigned rights that were phrased
vaguely enough that local authorities, if they so chose—and often they did—could refrain from
deporting guestworkers, thus allowing local employers to continue benefiting from the cheap
labor, even after the German government attempted to stem the inflow of guestworkers by
raising the recruitment fee for employers. The decision to allow guestworkers to stay was not
merely one of human rights, but one of practicality as well.
Of course, the result of the German government’s actions—or lack thereof—in 1973 was
the formation of permanent ethnic communities in Germany, as guestworkers not only stayed,
but brought their families over as well. Out of this emerged a strong resistance toward open
immigration policies in Germany, as well as a general lack of confidence that the German
government could ever be fully capable of controlling its borders. Furthermore, it gave rise to the
commonly held belief that most immigrants to Germany are coming over for benefits rather than
because of persecution, a sentiment that persists today in German immigration debates. It should
be additionally noted that Germany has a shrinking labor force, a fact that its government is quite
aware of. Visa programs for people in specialized fields—and to some extent, even Germany’s
current openness to refugees—are a response to this. This highlights a huge ideological divide
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between Germany’s government, which has been open to immigration at least for practical
reasons, and the country’s people.
Non-German German philosophy has shaped much of German politics since the end of
World War II, and the change to Germany’s nationality law in 2000 is the culmination of this
movement. For the first time, German national identity was based not in ethnicity, but became a
strictly political concept instead. However, while the German government recognizes German
nationals, regardless of ethnicity, as equal Germans, xenophobia persists in the country. Many
Germans are reluctant to accept immigrants because of the comparatively high rate of
unemployment among immigrant populations. However, this rate of unemployment can partially
be attributed to systemic discrimination within the workforce and in schools, thus prompting
native Germans to complain about a problem that they themselves perpetuate. In East Germany,
where the economy is weaker than in the West and the unemployment rate higher, concern is rife
that immigrants will take jobs and resources away from native Germans.
Xenophobia in Germany is particularly centered around Islamaphobia and this does have
an influence over Germans’ attitudes towards immigration. This emphasis on Islamaphobia is
largely due to the fact that the largest ethnic group to arrive in Germany during the guestworker
program were Turks, who are primarily Muslim. The Islamaphobia that exists within Germany
especially exemplifies that Habermas’ non-German German philosophy is hardly universal.
While there is a segment of German society that supports national identity as a purely political
concept, there is another segment that believes that a shared ethnicity and way of life define the
German people. Many Germans view Islam and Christianity as incompatible, while identifying
Christianity as an indispensible trait of German society. Furthermore, when one compares the
response of Germans to the predominately Muslim North African and Middle Eastern asylum-

64
seekers who are currently entering the country to their response to the European refugees that
arrived before the fall of the Iron Curtain, it becomes evident that Germans view other Europeans,
a group with whom they feel a shared identity, more favorably than they view non-European
“others.” Even as Germany continues to become more multicultural, the idea of the nonEuropean as an “other” persists. That acknowledged, the strong opposition to the proposal of a
German Leitkultur suggests that many Germans are resistant to antiquated ideas of nationality
when they recognize their similarities to the ideals of National Socialism. There is a deep-rooted
xenophobia with Germany that defines one side of the German immigration debate, but the other
side is open to immigration and supports a strictly political definition of German national identity,
one in which people of all ethnicities and cultures can become part of the German people, so
long as they cooperate with German law.
The progress of the philosophy of the non-German Germans took place mostly under an
SPD-led government. Under the CDU, national identity shifted back into a more cultural and
religious lens. While Germans would generally reject the suggestion that there is an ethnic aspect
to German national identity, the evolution of German asylum policy hints that an ethnic aspect
may exist as well. The narrowing of German asylum policy in 1992 reflects that the country’s
policies may have previously been focused on accepting refugees from East Germany, largely
considered to be members of the German community. Once Germany was reunified, there was
no longer any need for the German government to facilitate the asylum procedure for asylumseekers, as the country had finally reclaimed the members of its community who had been
confined in East Germany. This change in policy strongly suggests that German national identity
is still closely tied to culture, language, and even ethnicity, and that despite Germany’s pride in
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its human rights legacy, it is not actually the primary motivation for many of the country’s
policies.
The German government under Merkel is representative of the non-German German
reinvention of national identity, which rejects nationalism, which it has substituted somewhat
with an emphasis on a broader European identity. Furthermore, it recognizes the country’s need
for more workers, and thus is willing to accept more asylum-seekers, even at the behest of its
citizens, many of whom fear for their own jobs. Under Merkel, Germany has taken on a
leadership role in the migrant crisis not purely out of an interest for human rights, but
additionally due to its interest in promoting and maintaining solidarity in the European Union.
Furthermore, its acceptance of asylum-seekers is not born wholly out of the government’s
devotion to human rights, but largely due to the country’s desperate need for a young labor force.
This is not to argue that human rights is not a factor in the role the German government has
chosen to play in the current crisis; it is simply to say that it is not the only factor, nor is it the
most pressing one.
The German people are currently divided over the issue of asylum-seekers, with one side
represented by violent xenophobia, the other represented by open-armed acceptance of asylumseekers, and with a heavily populated moderate middle ground. Even the CDU-led German
government, though represented by Merkel and her repeated rhetoric of human rights, is divided
on the subject. The question therefore arises: is it a philosophy of human rights that is driving
Germany’s actions in the migrant crisis, or is it the product of fear that the failure to support this
philosophy might once again give rise to the ideals of National Socialism? Between the thought
processes of the sixty-eighters, who rejected the country’s history and promoted a human rights
agenda, and the forty-fivers, whose political objectives primarily centered around preventing the
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conditions that precipitated National Socialism from arising again, which more closely matches
the attitudes and motivations of German society today? Based on Germany’s policies since the
end of World War II, it appears that the philosophy of the forty-fivers is the one that has most
likely persisted into the present day, as Germany has previously put human rights ideals on the
backburner in the name of Schengen and European unity. Human rights are still important to
large portion of the German population, but it must be acknowledged much of the current drive
to accept asylum-seekers is a backlash against the country’s pre-1945 legacy. For many Germans,
the act of supporting human rights—and, by extension, the country’s acceptance of asylumseekers—is their way of rejecting the ideals that gave rise to National Socialism. This kneejerk
reaction is more representative of the philosophy of the forty-fivers than that of the sixty-eighters.
While the promotion of human rights is important to many Germans, this is just one facet of the
side of the German national identity debate that supports humanitarianism, inclusion and
tolerance, and an identity defined not by ethnicity, but rather by law alone. However, not
everyone in Germany supports this definition of German national identity, and it is here where
the debate over the migration crisis takes its roots.
In Dortmund, which hosts a large proportion of Germany’s asylum-seekers, officials have
been extracting World War II-era bombs from where they plan to construct housing for up to
1,000 asylum-seekers (Smale 2015). Regardless of the racism and xenophobia that exist within
Germany, asylum-seekers continue to arrive and Merkel’s government does what it can to
accommodate them. While German society remains divided between xenophobia and inclusion,
its government continues to exemplify the philosophy of the non-German Germans. Despite
some human rights failures in recent decades, particularly in reference to asylum law and the
recent EU-Turkey deal, Germany’s role in the current crisis represents a country that is, at least
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for now, increasingly defining itself as an ethnically diverse supporter of human rights, even if
not all Germans are in agreement on this new definition. As German officials swap World War II
bombs for housing for asylum-seekers, so too does a significant segment of German society seek
to swap a national identity based in antiquated notions of “Germanness” for one based in human
rights and a tolerance for diversity—a trend that, with time, will hopefully overcome the
xenophobia that still exists in the country. Opinions inevitably remain divided in Germany, but it
is inarguable that Germany’s response to the refugee crisis represents a pivotal reexamination of
what it means to be German.
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